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Abstract
Behavioral and managerial biases can occur among corporate executives that lead to suboptimal
decision making and outcomes for the shareholders. In the first essay, I study how the personal networks
of CEO affect the performance of the firm in the context of IPO. I find that CEOs at higher social
hierarchical positions can allow managerial entrenchment and prevent dismissal. The findings show that
influential CEOs are associated with higher IPO underpricing, lower likelihood of positive offer price
revision, and lower likelihood of wealth creation for the pre-IPO shareholders. In the second essay, I
explore how the social connections between bidder and bidder advisors affect M&A outcomes. I show
that the M&A deals with a bidder-bidder financial advisor connection exists have a lower CAR at
announcement than the deals without such connections. I also show that M&A deals advised by
personally connected financial advisor are more likely to complete but are executed less efficiently in
terms of time to resolution. I find evidence that both the bidder CEO and the financial advisor receive
higher cash bonus and advisor fees, respectively, when there are bidder-bidder financial advisor
connections exist. Behavioral bias can also occur among individuals and lead to asset bubbles, especially
in an environment with widely available credit and increased wealth inequality. In the third essay, using
an experimental approach, I study how wealth inequality, leverage, and the effect that people trying to
keep up with the status benchmark, which is so called “Joneses effect”, affect the asset bubbles. I find that
unequal initial endowments and the presence of a Joneses effect lead to substantial overpricing as
compared to situations where only unequal initial endowment or both factors are absent.
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Chapter 1
CEO Network Centrality and IPO Performance
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between the outcomes of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
and the personal social network of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) leading the firm at the time of the
IPO. We build on fast growing literature that deals with the importance of social ties – such as shared past
employment, shared educational overlaps or joint top positions in social clubs – in finance. So far, financial
research has documented both benefits and costs of such connections. Personal ties facilitate transfer of
information among corporate decision makers, which leads to more efficient loan contracting (Engelberg,
Gao, and Parsons, 2012), better analyst performance (Cohen, Malloy, and Frazzini, 2010), improved
portfolio manager performance (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008), greater M&A synergies (Cai and
Sevilir, 2012), and overall better corporate performance (Fracassi, 2014). On the other hand, inter-personal
connections have been found to interfere with optimal corporate governance and monitoring of managers
(Fracassi and Tate, 2012), to increase transaction costs (Cai, Walkling, and Yang, 2015), as well as to lead
to collusion among contracting managers at the expense of investors (Ishii and Xuan, 2014).
In the context of IPOs, finance studies so far have documented large benefits due to social ties. Cooney,
Madureira, Singh, and Yang (2015) find that investment banks are more likely to be included in the IPO
underwriting syndicate, and are more likely to serve in a leading role within the syndicate, if bankers have
bilateral social links to the IPO firm managers. The linked investment banks also receive higher
compensation and larger IPO share allocation. At the same time, though, linked underwriters are also able
to generate greater wealth gains for the pre-IPO shareholders (the gains on the shares those investors retain
significantly exceed losses due to underpricing). Chuluun (2015) shows that IPOs underwritten by
investment banks that occupy more central positions in the overall bank network, as well as banks that work
with partners with previous industry experience, are associated with higher likelihood of large positive IPO
subscription price revisions, as well as with higher short-run IPO stock returns.
Our paper builds on the previous IPO-related research, but unlike the effect of bilateral social links
(Cooney et al., 2015), our focus is on the overall position of CEOs within the full network of all business
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decision makers - officers and directors of both public and private firms worldwide. Our approach allows
us to capture the concept of social hierarchy. Bilateral ties often do not have an equal impact on the
connected parties. People who are in higher social hierarchical positions have superior opportunities to
transmit, gather, and control information, making such individuals more influential and powerful (e.g.
Mizruchi and Potts 1998). We follow graph theory studies (Proctor and Loomis, 1951; Sabidussi, 1966;
Freeman, 1977; Bonacich, 1972) that establish that social network centrality – a set of measures that
characterizes the overall position of an individual within a network – describes the personal ability to
influence information flows as well as contractual outcomes (e.g. Padgett and Ansell, 1993; Jackson, 2010).
In contrast to previous studies based on bilateral ties, we are able to capture the ability of the CEO to affect
information flows that pass through the entire network, and influence others even if no prior link exist. We
focus on two centrality measures commonly utilized in social network research: degree centrality (the
number of direct links between the CEO and any other members of the network) that assesses the personal
network size, as well as eigenvector centrality that evaluates the relevance of the personal network (by
giving greater weight to well-connected individuals linked to the CEO). Both of these measures have been
associated with greater individual influence and power (e.g. Mizruchi and Potts 1998). Consequently, we
utilize the measures of CEO influence and power to analyze the IPO outcomes to answer the following
questions: Are IPOs lead by well-connected CEOs associated with greater or lower underpricing? Do
underwriters of IPOs with central CEOs tend to adjust subscription prices prior to the IPO launch date?
And, ultimately, do initial pre-IPO owners gain or lose during IPOs managed by central CEOs?
Our emphasis on the centrality within individual networks (based on nearly 800,000 business
executives and board members of worldwide public and private firms, tracked by BoardEx database) is also
conceptually different from studies that examine the effects of overall firm connectedness – that is, a
position of a firm in the overall network of companies, typically based on board overlaps. The key
difference is that more central firms should unambiguously generate benefits for the investors from the
positions of higher influence and power. Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) show that high-centrality firms
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have superior accounting performance, Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) link high firm
centrality to lower loan costs and overall improved debt contracting, and Chuluun (2015) finds that more
central underwriters are associated with more valuable IPO outcomes. However, individual managers may
utilize their higher influence and power derived from more central network positions both for firm and
personal benefits. Fogel, Jandik, and McCumber (2015) show that high-centrality CFOs tend to negotiate
debt contracts that benefits their firms in the form of lower loan spreads and less restrictive covenant
structures. On the other hand, El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2015) document that high-centrality CEOs of
acquiring firms tend to launch M&A deals that benefit CEOs (in terms of higher pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits), but generate losses to the bidder shareholders. El-Khatib et al. (2015) further find that
high-centrality status enables CEOs to increase entrenchment, and mitigate both internal and external
monitoring and disciplining of their activities. Consequently, the ultimate impact of CEO centrality on IPO
outcomes examined in our study is an empirical issue.1
There are several reasons CEO centrality should affect IPO outcomes. Financial literature (e.g. Chava
and Purnanandam, 2009; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013) has documented that CEOs are the main firm
decision makers whose actions have the greatest impact on firm performance. The CEOs of IPO firms
should have even greater influence on their firms, because IPO companies tend to be relatively young and
small. IPO research ever since Rock (1986) has shown that information asymmetry between IPO insiders
and outside shareholders is positively associated with the magnitude of IPO underpricing (i.e. the stock
return on the IPO first trading day). High information asymmetry makes investments by outsiders riskier,
creating the need for higher underpricing in order to induce outside investor participation in the IPO. Since
greater network influence should allow CEOs superior access to information and better ability to
communicate information (Burt, 2011; Jackson, 2010; Newman, 2010), CEO centrality can reduce the
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Another difference between previous research on firm centrality and our focus on individual networks is the
computational complexity. Firm networks typically contain at most several thousands of nodes, and thus firm
centralities can be computed relatively quickly. On the other hand, individual networks involve hundreds of thousands
of nodes connected by many millions of links, making centrality computation very high computer memory-intensive.
For example, eigenvector centrality calculations for the network on links that exist in 2012 takes more than three days
to converge.
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information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors. High-centrality CEOs may also be
considered more trustworthy information sources, as networks facilitate information filtering, screening
and monitoring (Burt 1997, 2005, 2011; Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998). Next, network centrality may
facilitate reputation effects via voluntary bonding of highly central individuals, because networks allow
easier sanctioning of negative behavior and creating social liabilities (Boot et al., 1993; Burt, 2005; Brass
and Labianca, 2006). All of the above arguments imply that IPOs lead by well-connected CEOs should be
less risky due to a lower degree of information asymmetry, and as such associated with smaller
underpricing. On the other hand, high-centrality managers may be isolated from monitoring and market
discipline, allowing them to pursue activities that enrich managers at the expense of shareholders. El-Khatib
et al. (2015) find that highly central bidder CEOs are less likely to be fired after value-destroying
acquisitions, and that they use their superior access to information to benefit from insider trades – especially
inside selling.2 These results suggest that well-connected CEOs may have tendencies to get engaged in selfserving activities at the expense of shareholders. If high-centrality CEOs of IPO companies have similar
incentives, then new shareholders may perceive such IPOs as risky and demand higher compensation in the
form of greater underpricing for their willingness to invest.
While IPO research traditionally associates greater underpricing with risky IPOs subject to large
information asymmetry, some papers (e.g., Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 2001) consider higher
underpricing a sign of IPO success due to effective marketing effort of underwriters.3 Consequently, we
analyze additional IPO factors in order to provide truly unambiguous tests regarding the benefits and costs
of having a well-connected CEO at the time of an IPO. First, we study the determinants of the likelihood
of offer price increase from the initial filing range. Second, and more importantly, we analyze the total net
gain to pre-IPO owners due to the IPO process. We follow Cook, Kieschnick, and Van Ness (2006) and
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El-Khatib et al. (2015) document that a change from 25th to 75th sample percentile bidder CEO centrality is associated
with a 7.24 percentage point reduction in three-month returns following inside sell orders throughout CEO careers.
The overall mean and median career post-selling returns are negative for high-centrality CEOs.
3
On the other hand, IPO companies suffer monetary losses due to underpricing, and Dunbar (2000) shows that
underwriters that underprice their IPOs tend to subsequently lose market share.
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define the net IPO gain as the difference between IPO “wealth effect” (difference between the closing first
trading day price and the midpoint of the IPO’s initial filing range for the portion of shares pre-IPO owners
retain) and IPO “dilution effect” (the difference between the closing first trading day price and the offer
price for the portion of IPO shares sold). If high-centrality CEOs generate primarily benefits for the preIPO owners, then the likelihood of positive IPO net gain should be an increasing function of CEO centrality.
Our worldwide network of executives and directors of public and private companies is constructed
utilizing BoardEx database. BoardEx tracks interpersonal links created through past work relationships,
joint educational overlaps, and memberships in social clubs, charities, etc. We compute individual degree
and eigenvector centralities based on annual networks created from past employment in public and private
companies worldwide. Such links are typically reliably verifiable, not subject to self-reporting bias, and
most likely describe relationships where two linked individuals indeed met each other (unlike educational
links based on attending the same educational institution, often with dozens of thousands of students).4 We
assume that once established, links between two parties exist until one participant dies. As a result, our
social networks grow in size over time. In the last sample year, 2013, our worldwide network contains
nearly 41 million employment links formed by almost 560,000 firm executives and directors.
Based on a sample of 906 IPOs between 2001 and 2013, we find that high-centrality CEOs are
associated with higher underpricing. A firm whose CEO is in the 90th sample percentile of eigenvector
centrality has the initial underpricing return higher by 9.29 percentage points compared to a firm whose
CEO is in the 10th sample centrality percentile. This is a significant change compared to the median 8.16%
first-day return for the firms in our sample. At the same time, IPO firms with high centrality CEOs have a
significantly lower likelihood of offer price increase from the initial filing range. Ultimately, we document
that companies with well-connected CEOs have the lowest chance to generate positive IPO net wealth
effects – that is, the value-reducing dilution effect on shares sold dominates wealth gains on shares retained
for pre-IPO owners in these firms. All of our findings are consistent with the overall negative impact of
In unreported robustness analysis, we create networks based on alternative definitions of links – such as educational
and social overlaps. Our findings are similar to those presented in the main tables of this study.
4
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CEO influence and power – as proxied by network centrality – in the context of IPO process.
We further show the high underpricing persists, and the likelihood of positive net wealth effects is low
for IPOs with high centrality CEOs whose networks are “inefficient” – that is, large in size (high degree
centrality), but devoid of influential nodes (low eigenvector centrality). Such networks are least likely to
mitigate information costs and aid information transfer to investors.
Additionally, we document that one of the potential reasons for the problems associated with IPOs lead
by high centrality CEOs is that the managerial labor market disciplining mechanisms are weak for those
CEOs. While in general, low post-IPO long term performance is associated with higher likelihood of being
replaced (a finding that is similar to Jenter and Kanaan, 2015), we find that the magnitude of post-IPO
losses is unrelated to the turnover for high centrality CEOs. This finding suggests high network centrality
allows CEOs to insulate themselves from monitoring of their activities and to achieve greater entrenchment.
Last, we find that CEOs with high centrality generate significantly lower post-sale abnormal returns for
both two-month and three-month periods following their sale of company’s stock. Consequently, IPO firms
lead by high centrality CEOs may be perceived more risky because the CEOs with higher centrality tend to
more often sell their shares before negative information gets revealed (thus benefitting themselves at the
expense of the buyers), taking advantage of their insider information.
Our results hold under various robustness checks. Most importantly, CEO centrality effects are
unaffected even after we control for past relationships between the IPO firm managers and the underwriters
(Cooney et al., 2015). Also, our results are very similar to those presented in this study if we substitute CEO
centrality with the “excess centrality” equal to the difference between actual centrality and its predicted
level based on firm and personal determinants of centrality. Additionally, our results hold after we control
for effects of CEO’s age and years in the position.5 Last, our results are unaffected by inclusion of CEO
overconfidence measures, and by utilizing an instrumental variable approach. Based on our robustness
checks, our results are more likely due to the CEO network “social” capital (that is, information and
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In unreported results, we find that being an older CEOs can reduce the impact of CEO centrality on IPO underpricing,
but being a long tenured CEO does not have significant impact on IPO underpricing.
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reputational effects that can be attained via social networks - e.g. Woolcock, 1998), and less likely due to
CEOs “human” capital (that is, omitted variables related to skills and other personal attributes that may be
correlated with CEO centrality).
Our study makes several notable contributions. First, we add to the growing research on the importance
of social networks in financial contracting. We are the first paper to study the role of individual– as opposed
to firm – position within the whole social network of all business decision makers in the context of IPOs.
A more central place puts the CEO higher in the social network hierarchy, and enables the CEO to be more
influential and powerful. Our findings suggest that new IPO investors recognize that higher influence and
power allows the CEOs to achieve greater entrenchment and to diminish the effectiveness of monitoring of
CEO activities. Consequently, new investors demand higher compensation in the form of greater
underpricing for their willingness to invest, which causes substantial dilution effects on IPO shares sold,
and leaves pre-IPO investors with a lower likelihood of positive net wealth effects as the consequence of
the IPO. In this regard, our study provides a contrasting view on the role of networking in the IPO process
to papers that found prevailing beneficial effects for bilateral connections between IPO and underwriter
managers (Cooney et al., 2015) and for the underwriter firm-specific centralities (Chuluun, 2015).6
Second, we extend the literature on determinants of IPO underpricing and IPO overall wealth effects.
We show that in addition to the known firm- and deal-specific determinants, the social network position of
the CEO, related to influence and power, matter for IPO processes.
Third, we contribute to research on the role of personal traits in finance (e.g. Malmendier and Tate,
2008; Billett and Qian, 2008; Cronquist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2012; Otto, 2014). However, unlike many
previous studies where the personal traits of managers are taken from surveys or questionnaires (e.g.
Kaplan, Klebanov, Sorensen, 2012; Graham, Harvey, Puri, 2013), CEO influence and power studied in our
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We do not claim, however, that CEO centrality generates no benefits to investors. First, we find that underpricing is
lower, and the likelihood of positive IPO net wealth effects for pre-IPO owners is higher in cases of IPOs with CEOs
who have “efficient” networks (i.e., networks that are not characterized by the combination of high degree, but low
eigenvector centrality). Second, high CEO network centrality may produce significant advantages for firm’s day-today operations. The findings in this study suggest, though, that CEO network centrality may cause challenges within
the actual IPO process – that is, the sale of IPO shares to new investors.
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paper is based on quantifiable measures of network centrality, which utilizes objectively observable
existence of social links. Importantly, the network centrality based on past work-related relationships is
unlikely to be endogenous to the IPO outcomes we investigate. Network centrality is thus an ideal measure
for studying the impact of managerial behavior on corporate outcomes, because it does not bring issues of
potential reverse causality.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 presents the results and
robustness check. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
2.1 CEO centrality
We construct our centrality measures using data available from BoardEx. This database contains
information about bilateral connections, education background and employment history, as well
demographical and tenure information of the board members and senior executives of the firms all over the
world. BoardEx forms different networks based on geographical regions and the way that people in the
networks overlap. The entire network contains individual from all geographical regions with overlaps in
employment, education, and social activities. It covers 574,645 individuals with 60 million links in its
maximum network in 2013. In our paper, we use centrality measures generated from individuals’ overlap
in employment worldwide because that is the most reliable connection type. Education and social activity
connections are less reliable in that the sizes of the institutions (e.g., universities) where two overlapping
people meet tend to be big and therefore the chances are slim that two overlapping people even actually
interact during the years they both attend the institution. Our global network with employment overlapping
results in a total of 559,490 individuals with 41 million bilateral connections.
Centrality measures how powerful an individual is in a network. According to El-Khatib et al. (2015),
a powerful individual in a network might be efficient in reaching others and transferring information, which
leads to an improved position for bargaining and negotiation. Two common measures of centrality are
constructed in this paper: degree and eigenvector. Degree centrality measures how many nodes an
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individual is directly connected to. The more direct connections an individual has, the higher his/her degree
centrality is. Eigenvector centrality measures how important an individual is within a network. An
individual gets a higher eigenvector centrality measure if he/she has more connections with high degree
centrality measures.
We identify the CEO for the IPO firm in the IPO year through the BoardEx database.7 If a firm has two
or more co-CEOs in the IPO year, we pick the CEO with the highest centrality measure because we believe
that the CEO with the highest centrality measure should have more influence. To make our centrality
measures comparable across the years, we construct percentile values for both degree centrality and
eigenvector centrality by year, and the value ranges from 0, the lowest centrality, to 99, the highest centrality.
The percentile value reflects the ranking position of an individual in the entire network that we use, not just
the ranking within the sample CEOs. This transformation enables rank-order comparison of centrality
values across different years, even as the annual networks monotonously increase in size. In addition, the
percentile transformation allows easier discussion of centrality-related results, especially because the
eigenvector centrality values lack clear economic interpretation. In all tables and regression models
described below, CEO centrality is utilized in terms of percentages. However, significances of CEO
centrality coefficients are similar if we use raw centrality scores instead. We use the centrality measures of
the CEOs in the year prior to the firm’s IPO year to eliminate the timing concerns about the centrality
measures and IPO. In the regression analysis, we use natural logarithm of percentile ranking as the centrality
measure because there should be a diminishing marginal effect on the increases in percentile ranking. For
example, a CEO increasing her centrality ranking from 50th percentile to 60th percentile should have a
greater impact on the firm than another CEO who increases her centrality ranking from 80 th percentile to
90th percentile.
Table 1 summarizes the personal characteristics of CEOs in our sample. The mean age of CEOs in our
sample is 52, and they have been on the board for an average of 3 years. Average (median) number of CEO
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We also use BoardEx to obtain CEO characteristics including their employment history, age, tenure in position, and
tenure in company.
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connections in our sample is 174 (69). The CEOs have a mean (median) degree centrality percentile of 64
(67) and a mean eigenvector centrality percentile of 65 (67), suggesting that CEOs of IPO firms are better
connected compared to “typical” board members of executives of firms around the world.8
Table 1 - Summary Statistics of Sample CEOs
This table presents the summary statistics of individual characteristics of the CEOs in sample firms. Mean,
median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation are calculated for each individual characteristics
variable. Age is the CEO's age in the firm IPO year. Years to retirement is the years to CEO's expected
retirement, which is equal to 65. Years in role is the years that the CEO has held the current position. Years
on board is the years that the CEO has been on the board. Years in company is the years that the CEO has
been working at the current company. Degree centrality is the number of links a CEO has in the year prior
Variables

Mean

Median

P10

P90

Standard
Deviation

Age

51.50

51.00

42.00

62.00

7.98

Years in Role

2.21

0.70

0.00

6.50

3.63

Years on Board

2.95

0.80

0.00

7.90

4.75

Years in Company

3.51

0.80

0.00

9.30

5.44

173.57

68.50

15.00

464.00

249.46

Degree Centrality Percentile

63.62

67.00

27.00

93.00

24.72

Eigenvector Centrality Percentile

64.67

67.00

35.00

92.00

22.06

Degree Centrality Score

to IPO. Degree centrality percentile is the percentile ranking of the CEO in terms of the degree centrality
across all individuals in the BoardEx database in the year prior to IPO. Eigenvector centrality percentile is
the percentile ranking of the CEO in terms of the eigenvector centrality across all individuals in the BoardEx
database in the year prior to the IPO.

In addition to CEO centrality percentiles, we introduce another centrality measure: inefficient
networking. It is assessed based on the relation between CEO’s eigenvector centrality percentile and degree
centrality percentile. Since eigenvector centrality measures the importance of the connections whereas
degree centrality only measures the number of connection, CEOs with efficient networking should rank
higher in terms of eigenvector centrality than in degree centrality. We compute the difference between
CEOs eigenvector centrality percentile and degree centrality percentile, and create the inefficient network
dummy, which takes 1 if the difference is below 33rd percentile within the sample CEOs (that is, the
inefficiently networked executives rank high in terms of numbers of total links, but relatively low in terms
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On the other hand, there is still a considerable centrality dispersion in our sample. It contains CEOs with degree or
eigenvector centralities from the 1st percentile (that is, the second lowest) to the 99th percentile (that is, the highest).
The total numbers of CEO (degree) connections range from 1 to 1,815.
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of relevance of their connections).

2.2 IPO and firm financial data
We collect data on IPOs from 2001 to 2013 utilizing Thomson Financial’s SDC new issues database.
We only include IPOs domiciled in U.S. and exclude all close-end funds and unit offerings. The IPOs are
excluded if company financial data of is not available in CRSP. We then manually match the IPO firms in
SDC database with BoardEx database, and keep those observations that are available in both databases. We
further require CEO information to be available on BoardEx in the IPO year. Ultimately, our sample
contains 906 IPO firm (and, correspondingly, 906 CEOs). We obtain IPO proceeds, number of shares
offered to number of shares outstanding, price revision, underwriter compensation (measured by gross
spread), selling concession, whether an IPO is venture backed, Nasdaq return two weeks prior to IPO, and
whether the IPO is listed on NYSE from SDC database. We obtain underwriter ranking and firm age data
from Jay Ritter’s website. We discover whether CEO has bilateral connections with the underwriter prior
to the IPO using BoardEx database. Table 2 Panel A shows the distribution of sample IPOs by year. The
numbers of our IPOs gradually increase until the time of 2008-2009 financial crisis. Following the
substantial drop in IPO filings due to the financial crisis, the annual numbers of sample observations
continue to increase until the last sample year, 2013.
We obtain firm financial data from CRSP database. Additionally, we obtain insider trading data and
the data for computing CEO overconfidence from Thomson Reuters database. Firm financial data are based
on the fiscal year-end prior to the IPO year. Table 2 (Panel B) reports the summary statistics of the sample
firm’s financial variables and IPO variables.
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Table 2 Distribution of Sample IPOs by Year and Summary Statistics of Sample CEOs
Panel A presents the sample distribution of the 906 IPO firms in our sample by IPO year. The number of
observations, the percentage of the observations and the accumulative percentage of the observations are
calculated by year. Panel B presents summary statistics of a sample of 906 IPO firms from 2001 to 2013.
The mean, median, 10th percentile, 90th percentile, standard deviation and number of observations are
calculated for each financial variable. Total assets is the total assets of the IPO firm at the end of the fiscal
year before IPO. Total revenue is the total revenue of the IPO firm at the end of the fiscal year before IPO.
Net income is the net income of the IPO firm at the end of the fiscal year prior to IPO. ROA is the return
on assets the fiscal year prior to IPO. Debt ratio is the total debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal year
prior to IPO. IPO proceed is the amount the company raise in the IPO. First-day return is the percentage
change of the closing price on the IPO day from the offer price. Positive price revision is a dummy variable
that takes 1 if the offer price is greater than the middle filing price. Positive insider wealth gain is a dummy
variable that takes 1 if insider gain is greater than IPO dilution effect and 0 otherwise.
Panel A
Year

N

Percent

Cum.

2001

18

1.99

1.99

2002

16

1.77

3.75

2003

38

4.19

7.95

2004

121

13.36

21.30

2005

89

9.82

31.13

2006

123

13.58

44.70

2007

103

11.37

56.07

2008

12

1.32

57.40

2009

22

2.43

59.82

2010

74

8.17

67.99

2011

67

7.40

75.39

2012

82

9.05

84.44

2013

141

15.56

100.00

906

100

Total
Panel B

Total Assets

$ million

1886.60

144.76

21.22

2388.38

Standard
Deviation
12307.00

Total Revenue

$ million

901.82

94.96

1.89

1502.10

5376.69

Net Income

$ million

255.98

0.45

-34.70

54.46

5088.56

-26.66%

0.19%

-74.24%

15.73%

124.42%

0.32

0.18

0.00

0.73

0.52

Variables

Unit

ROA
Debt Ratio (Debt/Total Assets)
IPO Proceed ($ million)

$ million

First-day return

percentage

Mean

Median

p10

p90

310.70

121.90

42.00

529.70

1184.39

13.62%

8.16%

-4.21%

39.06%

21.85%

Positive Price Revision

0.61

1

0

1

0.49

Positive Insider Wealth Gain

0.62

1

0

1

0.48
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We measure IPO performance in three ways: first-day return, price revision, and insider wealth gain.
The first-day return (that is, IPO underpricing) is measured as the percentage gain at the close price on the
first trading day of the IPO as comparing with the offer price. Price revision is measured as the difference
between the offer price and the middle filing price for the IPO. Insider wealth gain captures whether the
insiders are better-off from the IPO by comparing the appreciation of their holding shares during the IPO
and value loss from the selling of their holdings during the IPO. Table 2 (Panel B) shows that the mean
(median) IPO underpricing is 13.62% (8.16%). The sample proportions of IPO firms experiencing positive
price revision (positive insider wealth gain) are 61% and 62%, respectively.Before performing
comprehensive multi-variate analysis of CEO network centrality on IPO performance, we present a
univariate analysis of first-day returns. We divide the sample into terciles based on CEO’s centrality
percentile rankings: top 33% (highest sample centrality percentiles), middle 33%, and bottom 33% (lowest
sample centrality percentiles); and compare the initial return between the three subsamples. The results are
presented in Table 3. Average first-day IPO return for the most connected CEOs based on degree
(eigenvector) centrality is 17.34% (17.33%), which is statistically significantly higher than the average
first-day return for the subsample of IPOs with the least connected CEOs, 11.06% (11.88%). Similarly,
median first-day IPO returns for the sample of most connected CEOs based on degree (eigenvector)
centrality, 10.00% (10.76%) are again significantly higher than the medians for the low centrality CEOs,
6.84% (6.75%). These findings suggest that IPOs managed by well-connected CEOs may be risky and/or
highly demanded by investors. Next section will thus provide a more comprehensive multivariate analysis
of the effects of CEO centrality on IPO outcomes.
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Table 3 Statistics of First-day return by Subsamples
This table presents the mean, median, minimum and maximum of first-day return for the full sample and 3
subsamples split by three different centrality measures of the CEOs. Degree centrality (percentile) is the
percentile ranking of the CEO by degree centrality score across all individuals in BoardEx database.
Eigenvector centrality (percentile) is the percentile ranking of the CEO by eigenvector centrality score
across all individuals in BoardEx database. *** and ** denote the statistical significance of the difference
in mean and median between top 33% and bottom 33% of the firms by centrality measures of their CEOs
at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Mean

Median

N

8.16%

903

Subsamples by Degree Centrality (Percentile)
11.06%
6.84%

306

Full Sample
13.62%

Bottom 33%
Middle 33%
Top 33%
Top - Bottom

Bottom 33%
Middle 33%
Top 33%
Top - Bottom

12.51%

6.58%

297

17.34%

10.00%

300

6.28%***

3.16**

Subsamples by Eigenvector Centrality (Percentile)
11.88%
6.75%
11.67%

304

6.88%

299

17.33%

10.76%

300

5.45%***

4.01%***

3. CEO Network Centrality and IPO Performance
3.1 Initial IPO Return
One of the most important measures of IPO performance is the return of the stock on the first day of
public trading. IPO is risky because of information asymmetries. We expect CEO centrality to be associated
with initial IPO returns for several reasons. First, CEOs with high centrality may use their position in the
network to efficiently gather and transfer private information so that it creates value for the company in the
IPO process. Second, network effect incentivizes CEOs to care more about their reputations. According to
Fogel et al. (2015), the existence of network makes it easier for others in the network to penalize the CEO
who conducts harmful behaviors to their firms and investors. Many scholars find that this phenomenon is
more profound for individuals standing at “the center of the stage” like CEO (see Boot et al. 1993; Burt,
2005; Brass and Labianca, 2006). Moreover, Graham et al. (2005) find that the first career concern for
executives is to maintain their reputations. Ultimately, both of the above reasons – easier access to and
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transfer of private information, as well as reputational effects – suggest that firms run by well-connected
CEOs are associated with lower information asymmetry, and lower risk for the investors. Consequently,
IPOs run by high centrality CEOs may be associated with low initial return on the first trading day, because
underwriter may upward revise the subscription price in conjunction with high demand on the firm’s stocks,
and IPO investors may not require high underpricing to compensate them for the risk of investment.
On the other hand, CEO centrality can have information asymmetry- and risk-enhancing impact on the
IPO firm. EI-Khatib et al. (2015) show that well-connected CEOs can take advantage of their power on the
board to influence the decisions of the board and reap private benefits at the expense of shareholders. ElKhatib et al. (2015) also show that CEOs with high centrality are able to avoid market discipline and
monitoring. In addition, Liu (2010) argues that CEOs are more likely to find a new position no matter for
what reasons they were laid off. Consequently, high CEO centrality may be associated with a high IPO
initial return.9
Table 4 reports the OLS regression estimates of IPO first-day return on CEO centrality, controlling for
IPO and firm characteristics. The dependent variable is the stock return of the firm on the IPO day measured
by percentage change from the offer price to the first closing price. The control variable selection follows
Cook et al. (2006). Importantly, since Cooney et al. (2015) find that the bilateral connection between CEO
and underwriter affects IPO outcome, both for shareholders of the IPO company (in terms of abnormal
returns earned) and the underwriters (in terms of their compensation), we control for past relationships
between the IPO firm managers and underwriters in this and all subsequent tables by including a dummy
variable tracking the presence of such bilateral connections. Model (1) uses degree centrality as CEO
centrality measure, model (2) and (3) use eigenvector centrality as CEO centrality measures, and model (3)
also adds the inefficient networking dummy. The results in all models show that CEO centrality – both

9

In this section, our arguments are based on the prevalent view that (high) initial IPO return is primarily linked to
(high) information asymmetry and (high) risk. On the other hand, some researchers (e.g. Krigman et al., 2001) consider
high underpricing the consequence of excess demand for shares, possibly due to successful marketing of the IPO by
underwriters. We address this potential explanation of underpricing in the next section, and find results largely
inconsistent with the excess demand driving underpricing in our sample.
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degree and eigenvector – is a positively significant determinant of IPO first-day returns. Firms with more
central CEOs have significantly higher IPO first-day returns than firms with less central CEOs. The
economic significance of CEO centrality measures is high. We find that all else equal, if CEO degree
centrality moves from 10th to 95th percentile ranking within our sample, IPO initial return would increase
by 5.18 percentage points. If CEO eigenvector centrality moves from 10th to 90th percentile ranking within
our sample, IPO initial return would increase by 9.29 percentage points. These are substantial changes given
the median 8.16% first-day return for the firms in our sample. The results in model (3) shows that inefficient
networking is positively correlated with high IPO initial returns. The results are supportive to our hypothesis
that CEO centrality increases the riskiness of IPO and thus results in a higher IPO initial return. Moreover,
the results show that inefficient networking further increases the risk of IPO evidenced by increasing 8.83
percentage points, on average, to the initial return of IPO. In all models, we control the firm size effect, IPO
characteristics, firm characteristics and the effect of IPO price revision. CEO centrality measures are still
positively significant with all the controls. 10
The results shown in table 4 suggest high CEO centrality may be associated with riskier IPOs, causing
the investors to demand higher compensation for their willingness to invest in the form of higher
underpricing. However, it is still possible that high underpricing can be a (positive) consequence of
increased demand for shares of IPOs managed by high centrality CEOs. Thus, in the next section, we
attempt to disentangle these two effects – high risk vs high demand – by studying the relation between CEO
centrality, IPO price revisions, and overall IPO wealth effects generated for firm initial investors.

10

In unreported analysis, we also regress the underwriter compensation, measured by gross spread and selling
concessions, on CEO centrality measures controlling for CEO-underwriter relationships. We find that the CEO
centrality measure does not significantly impact underwriter compensation.
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Table 4 Regression Estimates of IPO Underpricing and CEO Centrality
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimates of first-day return of IPO firms on centrality
measures of CEOs, inefficient networking measure and other control variables. The dependent variable is
the stock return of the firm on the IPO day measured by percentage change from the offer price to the first
closing price. CEO centrality of the IPO firm is degree percentile in column (1), eigenvector percentile in
columns (2) and (3). Inefficient networking is a dummy variable. It takes 1 if the value of a CEO's
eigenvector centrality percentile minus degree centrality percentile is ranked in bottom 33% of the sample
and 0 otherwise. Firm size is measured by natural logarithm of total revenue in the fiscal year prior to the
IPO. Float ratio is number of shares offered to number of shares outstanding after IPO. Ln(IPO Proceeds)
is the natural logarithms of IPO proceeds of the IPO firm. Underwriter ranking is a dummy variable that
takes 1 if the underwriter of the IPO has reputation rank being 8 or higher ranked by Loughran and Ritter
(2004) and the data is obtained from Jay Ritter’s website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.
NYSE is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the IPO is listed on NYSE. Venture backed IPO is a dummy
variable that takes 1 if the IPO is venture backed and 0 otherwise. Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO is
the NASDAQ return over the 2 weeks prior to the IPO. Firm age is the years from the firm's founding date,
which is obtained from http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm, and IPO filing date, which
is obtained from SDC. CEO connected with banker is a dummy that takes 1 if CEO has connection with
board of the underwriter. Price revision is the change from middle filling price to the offer price. Price
revision residual is the residual from the price revision regression. All independent variables and control
variables are lagged by one year. All models include year effects. Robust standard errors correcting
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return
Degree

(1)

(2)

(3)

Degree

Eigenvector

Inefficient Networking

0.0423**

0.0576**

(0.0174)

(0.0224)

0.0236**
(0.0117)

Eigenvector
Inefficient networking

0.0883**
(0.0382)

Firm Size
Float ratio
Ln(IPO proceeds)
Underwriter ranking
NYSE
Ventured backed IPO

-0.00668

-0.00635

-0.00707

(0.00747)

(0.00740)

(0.00759)

-127,883***

-129,829***

-130,904***

(32,540)

(32,708)

(32,913)

-0.141***

-0.143***

-0.156***

(0.0522)

(0.0532)

(0.0577)

0.0207

0.0208

0.0208

(0.0194)

(0.0196)

(0.0196)

0.0525**

0.0513**

0.0593**

(0.0256)

(0.0254)

(0.0277)

-0.110

-0.114

-0.127*

(0.0698)

(0.0715)

(0.0759)
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Table 4 Regression Estimates of IPO Underpricing and CEO Centrality (Cont.)

Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO
Firm age
CEO connected with banker

(1)

(2)

(3)

Degree

Eigenvector

Inefficient Networking

-0.00264

-0.00251

-0.00305

(0.00339)

(0.00335)

(0.00353)

0.000836*

0.000839*

0.000832*

(0.000503)

(0.000504)

(0.000496)

0.0159

0.0149

0.00904

(0.0374)

(0.0372)

(0.0372)

4.258***

4.246***

4.468***

(1.309)

(1.308)

(1.385)

-3.664***

-3.651***

-3.877***

(1.310)

(1.309)

(1.386)

0.873***

0.808***

0.777***

(0.294)

(0.267)

(0.252)

Year effects

Y

Y

Y

Observations

890

889

889

0.274

0.274

0.274

Price revision
Price revision residual
Constant

R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.2 Positive price revision
In this section, we investigate the relationship between CEO centrality and positive price revisions of
the subscription price from the initial filing price initiated by the underwriters. A positive price revision
benefits not only the IPO firm by raising more capital but also increases the wealth of pre-IPO shareholders
(Cooney et al., 2015). If CEO centrality has a positive impact on the firm and thus leads to a greater demand
for IPO shares, we expect to see a greater likelihood of positive price revisions in firms ran by CEOs with
high centrality.
Table 5 shows the Probit regression estimation of the likelihood of a positive price revision on CEO
centrality controlling for firm size effects, IPO characteristics, and firm characteristics. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the IPO has a positive price revision from midpoint of a filing
price range and 0 otherwise. Model (1) uses CEO degree centrality, and models (2) and (3) utilize CEO
eigenvector centrality. We include other control variables that are important in predicting price revision
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according to Cook et al. (2006), and also control for the existence of bilateral connections between the IPO
firm and the underwriter (Cooney et al. 2015). Our results show that high CEO centrality is associated with
lower likelihood of positive IPO price revisions (degree centrality insignificantly, but eigenvector centrality
significantly at 5% level). This result is economically significant. All else equal, an IPO firm with a withinsample 90th percentile centrality ranked CEO is 15.3% less likely to receive an upward price revision than
an IPO firm with a within-sample 10th percentile centrality ranked CEO (a rather substantial increase given
the 61% sample unconditional frequency of positive price adjustments).
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Table 5 Regression Estimates of IPO Positive Price Revision and CEO Centrality
This table presents the probit regression estimates of positive price revision of IPO firms on centrality
measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 if
there is a positive price revision from middle filling price to offer price and 0 otherwise. CEO centrality of
the IPO firm is degree percentile in column (1), and eigenvector percentile in columns (2) and (3).
Inefficient networking is a dummy variable. It takes 1 if the value of a CEO's eigenvector centrality
percentile minus degree centrality percentile is ranked in bottom 33% of the sample and 0 otherwise. Firm
size is measured by natural logarithm of total revenue in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Ln(IPO Proceeds)
is the natural logarithms of IPO proceeds of the IPO firm. NYSE is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the
IPO is listed on NYSE. Venture backed IPO is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the IPO is venture backed
and 0 otherwise. Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO is the NASDAQ return over the 2 weeks prior to the
IPO. Firm age is the years from the firm's founding date, which is obtained from
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm, and IPO filing date, which is obtained from SDC.
CEO connected with banker is a dummy that takes 1 if CEO has connection with board of the underwriter.
All independent variables and control variables are lagged by one year. All models include year effects.
Robust standard errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Dep. Variable = Prob(positive offer price revision)
Degree

(1)

(2)

Degree

Eigenvector

(3)
Inefficient
Networking

-0.193**

-0.215**

(0.0943)

(0.0975)

-0.0790
(0.0875)

Eigenvector
Inefficient networking

-0.147
(0.0944)

Firm Size
Ln(IPO proceeds)
NYSE
Ventured backed IPO
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO
Firm age
CEO connected with banker
Constant
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0.00336

0.00310

0.00257

(0.0304)

(0.0305)

(0.0304)

0.426***

0.434***

0.441***

(0.0652)

(0.0661)

(0.0665)

-0.232**

-0.228**

-0.238**

(0.114)

(0.115)

(0.114)

0.321***

0.341***

0.345***

(0.105)

(0.105)

(0.105)

0.0217

0.0212

0.0214

(0.0144)

(0.0144)

(0.0144)

-0.00261

-0.00259

-0.00242

(0.00201)

(0.00200)

(0.00201)

0.0164

0.0365

0.0483

(0.194)

(0.193)

(0.194)

-1.613***

-1.193**

-1.060*

(0.532)

(0.541)

(0.557)

Table 5 Regression Estimates of IPO Positive Price Revision and CEO Centrality (Cont.)
Year effects

Y

Y

Y

Observations

906

905

905

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results do not support the hypothesis that high CEO centrality has a risk-reducing impact on the
IPO firm. Rather, firms with high centrality CEO are perceived as riskier and thus its IPO need to be
underpriced more to compensate the risk that investors are bearing. Therefore, the underwriter is thus less
likely to revise the subscription price upward.
3.3 Insider wealth gain
According to Loughran and Ritter (2002), Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Cooney et al. (2015), initial
return and price revision do not show a comprehensive picture of IPO performance. Pre-IPO shareholders’
main goal is to obtain wealth gain through the IPO. Hence, a successful IPO should gain wealth for the
insiders. We examine whether high centrality CEO is associated with positive wealth gain for the pre-IPO
shareholders. If CEO’s high centrality has a positive effect on IPO firm, it should be associated with higher
likelihood of pre-IPO shareholder gaining wealth and vice versa. Pre-IPO shareholders’ wealth increases
when IPO firm has a positive price revision from initial filling price and positive return on the first day of
trading for the shares that they retain from pre-IPO to post-IPO. Pre-IPO shareholders lose wealth when
they sell the shares at the offer price and the price per share increases thereafter, which cause them “leave
the money on the table”. We compute pre-IPO shareholders’ wealth gain from retained shares net of wealth
loss from sold shares in IPO. That is, the wealth gain is defined as:
Wealth effect = (1st day closing price – midpoint of filling price range) × shares retained –
(1st day closing price – offer price) × shares sold
We investigate if high centrality CEO is associated with high likelihood of positive wealth gain by preIPO shareholders. (Cooney et al. (2015) perform a similar analysis in their investigation of bilateral links
between IPO firms and underwriters.)
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Table 6 shows the results of probit regression of probability of positive wealth gain by pre-IPO
shareholders on CEO centrality, IPO characteristics, firm characteristics and connection between CEO and
underwriter’s board members. Model (1) uses degree centrality as CEO centrality measure, model (2) and
(3) use eigenvector centrality as CEO centrality measures, and model (3) adds inefficient networking
dummy. The selection of control variables follows Cook et al. (2006). The results show CEO centrality is
negatively associated with the likelihood of positive wealth gain by the pre-IPO shareholders (degree
centrality not significantly, but eigenvector centrality significantly at 5% level). This suggests that high
CEO centrality does not benefit pre-IPO shareholders during the IPO process, and is consistent with our
findings in previous tables showing that IPO firms managed by well-connected CEOs have greater IPO
underpricing and lower likelihood of positive subscription price revisions. Model (3) further indicates that
inefficient networking also significantly reduces the likelihood of positive wealth gain by the pre-IPO
shareholders.
Our findings are economically significant. All else equal, a firm with a CEO at the 90 th percentile
centrality ranking in our sample would have 18.0 percentage points less likely to have a positive wealth
gain by pre-IPO shareholders than a firm with a CEO at the 10th percentile centrality ranking (a substantial
change given the unconditional sample frequency of IPOs with a positive wealth effect is equal to 62.4%).
Overall, our findings in Tables 3-6 provide evidence on significant links between CEO centrality and
firm’s IPO performance. High centrality CEOs are associated with high IPO underpricing for the firm. The
high underpricing of those IPOs does not indicate the success of the IPO marketing. Instead, it reflects the
higher risk the market perceives, implying a larger discount in the offer price. The higher risk of IPOs
managed by high centrality CEOs is further evidenced by a lower likelihood of positive IPO price revisions
and lower likelihood of pre-IPO shareholders’ wealth gains. Additionally, we find evidence that high
underpricing, low likelihood of positive price revisions, and lower likelihood of pre-IPO shareholders’
wealth gains are all further exacerbated if CEOs are inefficiently networked – that is, if they have many
connections with little overall importance for the network.
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Table 6 Regression Estimates of Positive Insider Wealth Effects and CEO Centrality
This table presents the probit regression estimates of insider wealth gain of IPO firms on centrality measures
of CEOs, efficient networking measures of CEOs and other control variables. The dependent variable is a
dummy that takes 1 if there is an insider wealth gain and 0 otherwise. Follow Cook et al. (2006), we define
insider wealth gain as the wealth effects of IPO minus dilution effects of IPO. CEO centrality of the IPO
firm is degree percentile in column (1), eigenvector percentile in columns (2) and (3). Inefficient networking
is a dummy variable. It takes 1 if the value of a CEO's eigenvector centrality percentile minus degree
centrality percentile is ranked in bottom 33% of the sample and 0 otherwise. Firm size is measured by
natural logarithm of total revenue in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Float ratio is number of shares offered
to number of shares outstanding after IPO. Ln(IPO Proceeds) is the natural logarithms of IPO proceeds of
the IPO firm. CEO connected with banker is a dummy that takes 1 if CEO has connection with board of the
underwriter. Firm age is the years from the firm's founding date, which is obtained from
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm, and IPO filing date, which is obtained from SDC.
Residual of initial return is the residual from the initial return regression. All independent variables and
control variables are lagged by one year. All models include year effects. Robust standard errors correcting
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1)

(2)

Dep. Variable = Prob(positive insider wealth gain)

Degree

Eigenvector

(3)
Inefficient
Networking

Degree (Percentile)

-0.0494
-0.216**

-0.246***

(0.0891)

(0.0912)

(0.0898)
Eigenvector
Inefficient networking

-0.175*
(0.0996)

Firm Size
Float ratio
Ln(IPO proceeds)
CEO connected with banker
Firm age
Residual of initial return
Constant

0.0315

0.0280

0.0258

(0.0293)

(0.0295)

(0.0294)

-1.066e+06***

-1.161e+06***

-1.186e+06***

(262,866)

(261,927)

(265,390)

0.380***

0.395***

0.402***

(0.0620)

(0.0633)

(0.0635)

0.0459

0.0813

0.0986

(0.205)

(0.205)

(0.206)

-0.00622***

-0.00616***

-0.00605***

(0.00212)

(0.00212)

(0.00213)

3.106***

3.123***

3.144***

(0.323)

(0.324)

(0.326)

-0.866

-0.206

-0.0309

(0.562)

(0.553)

(0.568)

Year effects

Y

Y

Y

Observations

890

889

889

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.4 Post-IPO CEO Turnover
The managerial labor market offers a mechanism that disciplines the senior managers in order to work
in the interest of the shareholders. Well-governed firms optimally fire managers associated with poor firm
performance (e.g. Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). However, if well-connected CEOs are able to utilize their
influence and power to gain more secure entrenchment, then managerial labor market fails its important
governance role, and the IPOs lead by such CEOs may be perceived inherently more risky, which may
indeed lead to higher underpricing and lower likelihood of positive price adjustments, as well as positive
wealth effects described in Tables 4-6.
Following Jenter and Kanaan (2015) and El-Khatib et al. (2015), we use Cox Hazard model to test how
post-IPO stock performance (measured by the one-year abnormal stock return after the IPO) impact the
odds of the CEO leaving the firm after the IPO. We obtain CEO turnover data by examining their
employment history in the BoardEx database. Of the final sample of 597 CEOs based on data availability,
198 were replaced during the first three years post-IPO.11 We utilize the following specification of Cox
Hazard model:
(CEO Turnover = 1|𝑋𝑖 )
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽3 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽4 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 × (1 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖
where the dependent variable is the hazard rate of CEO turnover in the sample period. The one-year
abnormal return is the stock return of the IPO firm from the first closing day to the 12th month after the IPO
month in excess of a value-weighted market portfolio return. High centrality is a dummy variable that takes
1 if the CEO’s centrality measure falls in the top 33% of the sample and 0 otherwise. CEO age is the age
Due to a relatively small IPO sample size, we retain all CEO replacements, not just “disciplinary”, defined by
Parrino (1997) to be replacement that are not due to CEO retirement or reassignment within a company (e.g. CEO
move to the Chairman of Board). However, our results are qualitatively similar, albeit less significant, if utilize just
disciplinary turnovers in our analysis.
11
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of CEO at the time of IPO. Firm size is the total revenue of the IPO company in the fiscal year prior to the
IPO. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal
year of IPO multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of
preferred stock, all divided by the book value of the total assets. Fi is a vector of firm specific financial
characteristics. Industry fixed effect is a series of dummy variables indicating the industry of the IPO firm.
Crisis year dummy takes value 1 if the firm’s IPO is in year 2008 or 2009 and 0 otherwise.
The results are presented in Table 7. Consistent with previous literature (e.g. Jenter and Kanaan, 2015),
Model 1 shows that the likelihood of CEO turnover is negatively correlated with post-IPO performance,
suggesting that CEOs with poorer firm long-term performance are more likely to be replaced. However,
Models 2 and 3 suggest that only low centrality CEOs tend to be replaced in case of poor stock returns, as
evidenced by significantly negative coefficients for Abnormal Return*[1- High Centrality dummy]. The
coefficient measuring the turnover-performance sensitivity for the subsample of high centrality CEOs
(measured by Abnormal Return*[High Centrality dummy] coefficient) is insignificant. Models 2 and 3
further show that centrality per se is an insignificant determinant of CEO turnover. Ultimately, our findings
suggest that well-connected CEOs are able to utilize their influence and power to solidify their
entrenchment in the post-IPO firm. 12
3.5 CEO Centrality and Insider Trading
Finance literature documents that sales of firm’s shares initiated by company’s insiders are associated
with a negative signal about the future firm value (Seyhun 1992; Clarke et al. 2001). We test if CEOs with
high centrality are more likely to take advantage of insider information and execute sales that are followed
by low abnormal stock returns. If so, investing in firms run by CEOs with high centrality should be
perceived as risky, and the company such CEOs lead should have high underpricing, low probability of
positive price revision and low probability of wealth gain to the existing shareholders during the IPO.

12

In unreported analysis, we get similar results if we replace post-IPO abnormal stock returns with post-IPO
accounting returns as the measure to determine performance-turnover sensitivity.
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Table 7 Cox Hazard Regression Estimates of CEO Turnover
This table presents the estimation results of the Cox Hazard regression model to predict the CEO turnover
after an IPO between 2001 and 2014. The dependent variable is the hazard rate of CEO turnover in the
sample period. The CEO turnover is measured in the 3 years post-IPO. The 1-year abnormal return is the
stock return of the IPO firm from the first closing day to the 12th month after the IPO month in excess of a
value-weighted market portfolio return, respectively. High centrality is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the
CEO’s centrality measure falls in the top 33% of the sample and 0 otherwise. CEO age is the age of CEO
at the time of IPO. Firm size is the total revenue of the IPO company in the fiscal year prior to the IPO.
Tobin’q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year
of IPO multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred
stock, all divided by the book value of the total assets. Industry fixed effect is a series of dummy variables
indicating the industry of the IPO firm. Crisis year effect takes value 1 if the firm’s IPO is in year 2008 or
2009 and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1)
Dep.variable = Prob(CEO turnover)
1-year Abnormal Return

(2)

(3)

Eigenvector

Degree

-6.668***
(1.824)

Degree

0.199
(0.153)

Eigenvector

-0.0431
(0.160)

1-year Abnormal Return * (1 - High Centrality)
1-year Abnormal Return * High Centrality
CEO Age
Firm Size
Tobin's Q
Industry Fixed Effect
Crisis Year Effect
Observations

-6.933***

-7.659***

(2.079)

(2.193)

-5.560

-4.848

(3.667)

(3.387)

0.00465

0.00443

0.00482

(0.00872)

(0.00876)

(0.00885)

-0.000138*

-0.000137*

-0.000151*

(7.92e-05)

(7.89e-05)

(8.15e-05)

-0.00284

-0.00368

-0.00395

(0.0354)

(0.0353)

(0.0358)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

597

596

597

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We analyze the stock performance following the sales executed by the CEOs in our sample within 1
year after the IPO. We use three- and two-month abnormal return to measure the stock performance. In
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Table 8, we find that CEOs with high centrality are associated with lower three-month and two-month
abnormal returns following a sale. The results hold after controlling for the size effect of the firm and the
IPO, as well as the industry fixed effect using 4-digit SIC code of the company. Therefore, our findings
provide supporting evidence as for why firms led by CEOs with high centrality are perceived as riskier.

Table 8 Post-Insider Sale Performance and CEO Centrality
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of post-insider sale abnormal returns on the centrality
measures, size of firm and IPO, and industry effect dummies as control variables. The dependent variable
for columns (1) and (3) is three-month abnormal return of the security following an insider sale. The
dependent variable for columns (2) and (4) is two-month abnormal return of the security following an
insider sale. Firm size is measured by natural logarithm of total revenue in the fiscal year prior to the IPO.
Ln(IPO Proceeds) is the natural logarithms of IPO proceeds of the IPO firm. Industry fixed effect is a series
of dummy variables indicating the industry of the IPO firm using 4-digit SIC code. Robust standard errors
are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.

Degree

(1)
Three-month
Abnormal Return

(2)
Two-month
Abnormal Return

-0.0705**

-0.0646***

(0.0289)

(0.0223)

Eigenvector
Firm Size
Ln(IPO proceeds)

(3)
Three-month
Abnormal Return

(4)
Two-month
Abnormal Return

-0.0594*

-0.0557**

(0.0351)

(0.0264)

8.14e-05

6.95e-05

7.09e-05

6.03e-05

(4.96e-05)

(4.22e-05)

(4.97e-05)

(4.31e-05)

-0.000510

-0.00481

-0.00123

-0.00547

(0.00606)

(0.00428)

(0.00595)

(0.00421)

0.201

0.220**

0.161

0.188*

(0.125)

(0.0918)

(0.146)

(0.105)

Constant
Industry Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

1,173

1,173

1,173

1,173

R-squared

0.251

0.222

0.248

0.218

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.6 Endogeneity and Centrality Determinants
3.6.1 Instrumental variable analysis
In our paper, we suggest a causal relation between CEO centrality and IPO outcomes. While it is not
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likely that the execution of IPO affects CEO centrality directly, we still want to consider the possibility that,
for example, greater underpricing benefitting new shareholders may give CEO opportunity to enhance his
or her network due to new relationships with these investors. We thus utilize an instrumental variable
approach to study the causal relationship between CEO centrality and IPO performance. In the first stage
of the analysis, we use two instrumental variables that are directly related to CEO centrality but are unlikely
to affect the IPO outcomes to create the instrumented centralities. We use the mean centrality of other CEOs
in the same state13 as the IPO firm, and the IPO firm’s corporate social responsibility index14 (CSR) as the
instrumental variables for the CEO centrality. Then, in the second stage, we use the instrumented centrality
to regress IPO performance. Table 9 presents the results of the instrumental variable approach analysis.
Panel A columns (1) and (2) show the first stage of the analysis. The two instrumental variables are
positively significant in predicting CEO centralities. The columns (3) and (4) in Table 9 reports the analysis
of IPO underpricing using the instrumented CEO degree and eigenvector centralities, respectively. We
show that both instrumented centrality measures are highly significant15. The Panels B and C of Table
present the regression estimations of the probabilities of positive offer price revision and insider wealth
gain, respectively. The instrumented centrality measures in those results are all highly significant with the
same sign as in our main analysis reported in Table 5 and 6. Therefore, possible endogeneity thus likely
does not create interpretation issues for the results reported in this paper.

13

We collect the centrality of all the S&P 1500 firms in the same state as the IPO firm in the same year of the IPO,
and calculate the mean of the CEOs’ centrality.
14
We follow Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017) to create an index ranges from -5 to 5 to reflect the firm’s
performance in community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and human rights, and use the median index
within the sample period for each firm.
15
It is not surprising, though, that the coefficients of the instrumented centrality measures are larger than those of
the centrality measures because the instrumented centrality measures are the local average of the centrality
conditional on the centrality determinants and that the standard error of the coefficient estimation is significantly
larger, which is the price to pay for a variable to be considered as endogenous (Wooldridge 2015).
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Table 9 Instrumental Variable Approach Analysis of IPO Performance
This table presents the results of the instrumental variable approach analysis of IPO Performance. Panel A
columns (1) and (2) presents the regression results of the CEO centrality with instrumental variables. Mean
Degree (Eigenvector) Centrality of CEOs in Same State is the average of all CEOs of the S&P 1500 firms
in the same state as the IPO firm in the same year. Firm CSR is the median of the company’s social
responsibility index based on Lins et al. (2017) across all sample period. Columns (3) and (4) presents the
results of OLS regression estimates of first-day return of IPO firms on instrumented centrality measures of
CEOs and other control variables. Panel B presents the result probit regression estimates of positive price
revision of IPO firms on instrumented centrality measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 if there is a positive price revision from middle filling
price to offer price and 0 otherwise. Panel C presents the probit regression estimates of insider wealth gain
of IPO firms on instrumented centrality measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The dependent
variable is a dummy that takes 1 if there is an insider wealth gain and 0 otherwise. All other variables are
as previously explained. All models include year effects. Robust standard errors correcting
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Instrumented Centrality and IPO Underpricing

Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return
Mean Degree Centrality of CEOs in Same
State

(1)
Degree
Centrality

(3)
IPO
Underpricing

0.115*
(0.0601)

0.0155***
(0.00508)
0.141**
(0.0549)

Instrumented Degree Centrality

1.828**
(0.834)

Instrumented Eigenvector Centrality
Firm Size
Float ratio
Ln(IPO proceeds)
Underwriter ranking
NYSE
Ventured backed IPO
Price revision
Firm age

(4)
IPO
Underpricing

0.0193***
(0.00531)

Mean Eigenvector Centrality of CEOs in
Same State
Firm CSR

(2)
Eigenvector
Centrality

0.0233
(0.0186)
-358,453**
(155,684)
0.0163
(0.0358)
0.0779
(0.0931)
0.0372
(0.0474)
0.144***
(0.0544)
-0.285*
(0.147)
0.000793
(0.000640)
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0.0150
(0.0114)
-289,516
(188,721)
0.0171
(0.0263)
0.129
(0.113)
0.0501
(0.0400)
0.105**
(0.0502)
-0.277**
(0.134)
0.000397
(0.000590)

-0.0801**
(0.0403)
-63,927
(44,242)
-0.181**
(0.0898)
-0.0287
(0.0229)
0.0242
(0.0210)
-0.546*
(0.286)
4.504**
(1.947)
-0.000476
(0.000354)

1.108**
(0.551)
-0.0352*
(0.0208)
-95,378**
(47,680)
-0.118*
(0.0640)
-0.0307
(0.0227)
0.00584
(0.0182)
-0.276
(0.171)
2.941**
(1.272)
8.68e-05
(0.000439)

Table 9 Instrumental Variable Approach Analysis of IPO Performance (Cont.)

Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return
Price revision residual

(1)
Degree
Centrality

(2)
Eigenvector
Centrality

2.782***
(0.402)

(3)
IPO
Underpricing
-3.780*
(1.945)
-0.0604
(0.0442)
-0.00633
(0.00556)
-5.707**
(2.635)

(4)
IPO
Underpricing
-2.239*
(1.272)
-0.0420
(0.0399)
-0.00271
(0.00419)
-3.401*
(1.753)

2.535***
(0.417)

629
0.070

628
0.256

628
0.251

CEO connected with banker
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO
Constant

Observations
629
Adjusted R-squared
0.076
Panel B: Instrumented Centrality and IPO Positive Price Revision

(1)
Degree

Dep. Variable = Prob(positive offer price revision)
Instrumented Degree Centrality

(2)
Eigenvector

-3.366***
(0.595)

Instrumented Eigenvector Centrality
Ln(IPO proceeds)
Firm Size
NYSE
Ventured backed IPO
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO
Firm age
CEO connected with banker
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Panel C: Instrumented Centrality and Insider Wealth Effect

0.538***
(0.0959)
0.119***
(0.0417)
-0.175
(0.147)
1.053***
(0.176)
0.0186
(0.0171)
-0.000975
(0.00247)
-0.0499
(0.239)
10.57***
(2.365)

-3.699***
(0.586)
0.574***
(0.0981)
0.0918**
(0.0402)
-0.126
(0.148)
1.011***
(0.164)
0.0211
(0.0171)
-0.00229
(0.00236)
-0.0160
(0.232)
11.81***
(2.319)

629
0.133

629
0.140
(1)
Degree

Dep. Variable = Prob(positive insider wealth gain)
Instrumented Degree Centrality

-1.868***
(0.556)
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(2)
Eigenvector

Table 9 Instrumental Variable Approach Analysis of IPO Performance (Cont.)
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive insider wealth gain)

(1)
Degree

(2)
Eigenvector

0.365***
(0.0847)
0.0347
(0.0375)
-1.557e+06***
(431,599)
0.143
(0.242)
-0.00566**
(0.00237)
2.726***
(0.378)
6.955***
(2.378)

-2.839***
(0.589)
0.415***
(0.0864)
0.0228
(0.0382)
-1.859e+06***
(418,025)
0.193
(0.236)
-0.00618***
(0.00231)
2.863***
(0.388)
10.81***
(2.471)

628
0.129

628
0.146

Instrumented Eigenvector Centrality
Ln(IPO proceeds)
Firm Size
Float ratio
CEO connected with banker
Firm age
Residual of initial return
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.6.2 Centrality determinants and excess centrality
In this paper, we argue that higher underpricing, lower likelihood of positive price revisions, and lower
likelihood of positive wealth effects for the pre-IPO shareholders are all due to CEOs who have superior
network positions, and thus are likely to possess greater “social capital.” At the same time, CEOs who have
superior skills – and thus possess greater “human capital” – may have easier time networking, as many
individuals likely enjoy being connected to skilled managers. Simultaneously, more skilled CEOs may have
superior entrenchment abilities, greater opportunities to benefit from their insider trades, etc. Consequently,
our findings of links between CEO centrality and IPO outcomes may also be due to CEO human capital,
and not just CEO network-related social capital. In this section, we address whether the relations attributed
to network centrality in our paper may be partially due to omitted variables associated with centrality (both
individual characteristics and firm-specific variables) in addition to network effects captured by centrality.
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In order to analyze the role of potentially omitted centrality determinants, we employ the “excess
centrality” developed by El-Khatib et al. (2015). “Excess centrality” is defined as the residual from
regression of centrality (degree or eigenvector) on CEO personal attributes and firm characteristics. A CEO
with high “excess centrality” should be again considered influential and powerful, but “excess centrality”
is now unrelated to the individual- and firm-related determinants of centrality.
We rerun all of the models presented in Tables 4-6 with centrality variables replaced by “excess
centrality”. The centrality determinants considered include: (a) number of boards of public and private firms
the CEO is a member of, (b) number of sectors the CEO worked in, (c) CEO age, (d) CEO tenure on the
company’s board, and (e) firm’s (sales) size. The results are shown in Table 10 Panels A, B, and C for the
estimations of IPO underpricing, probability of positive offer price revision, and probability of insider
wealth gain, respectively. Our results have very similar high significances, and identical signs, suggesting
that the centrality measures indeed reflect the impact of CEO network (social capital) effects, as opposed
to the impact of omitted variables.
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Table 10 Analysis of IPO Performance and Excess Centrality
This table presents the results of the analysis of IPO Performance on excess CEO centrality measures.
Excess centrality is defined as the residual from regression of centrality (degree or eigenvector) on number
of boards of public and private firms the CEO is a member of, number of sectors the CEO worked in, CEO
age, CEO tenure on the company’s board, and firm’s (sales) size. Panel A presents the results of OLS
regression estimates of first-day return of IPO firms on excess centrality measures of CEOs and other
control variables. Panel B presents the result probit regression estimates of positive price revision of IPO
firms on excess centrality measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable that takes 1 if there is a positive price revision from middle filling price to offer price and
0 otherwise. Panel C presents the probit regression estimates of insider wealth gain of IPO firms on excess
centrality measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes 1
if there is an insider wealth gain and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as previously explained. All models
include year effects. Robust standard errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Excess Centrality and IPO Underpricing
(1)
Degree
0.0420**
(0.0190)

Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return
Excess Degree Centrality
Excess Eigenvector Centrality
Firm Size
Float ratio
Ln(IPO proceeds)
Underwriter ranking
NYSE
Ventured backed IPO
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO
Price revision
Firm age
CEO connected with banker
Price revision residual
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
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(2)
Eigenvector

-0.0117
(0.00985)
-104,565***
(31,946)
-0.0981*
(0.0527)
0.0193
(0.0186)
0.0309
(0.0245)
-0.0854
(0.0721)
0.00101
(0.00263)
3.660***
(1.408)
0.000726
(0.000588)
-0.0176
(0.0346)
-3.096**
(1.411)
0.749**
(0.334)

0.0567**
(0.0266)
-0.0106
(0.00957)
-107,264***
(32,182)
-0.0962*
(0.0530)
0.0194
(0.0188)
0.0291
(0.0242)
-0.0829
(0.0726)
0.00135
(0.00254)
3.541**
(1.380)
0.000710
(0.000589)
-0.0159
(0.0341)
-2.977**
(1.383)
0.734**
(0.335)

782
0.243

781
0.242

Table 10 Analysis of IPO Performance and Excess Centrality (Cont.)
Panel B: Excess Centrality and IPO Positive Price Revision
(1)
Degree

Dep. Variable = Prob(positive offer price revision)
Excess Degree Centrality

(2)
Eigenvector

-0.0878
(0.0986)

Excess Eigenvector Centrality
Ln(IPO proceeds)
Firm Size
NYSE
Ventured backed IPO
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO
Firm age
CEO connected with banker
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Panel C: Excess Centrality and Insider Wealth Effect
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive insider wealth gain)
Excess Degree Centrality

0.416***
(0.0713)
0.00383
(0.0322)
-0.209*
(0.126)
0.247**
(0.111)
0.0122
(0.0152)
-0.00293
(0.00209)
-0.00116
(0.209)
-1.830***
(0.440)

-0.202*
(0.103)
0.421***
(0.0721)
0.00430
(0.0323)
-0.207*
(0.126)
0.267**
(0.112)
0.0113
(0.0152)
-0.00297
(0.00208)
0.00781
(0.208)
-1.863***
(0.443)

798
0.0698

797
0.0720

(1)
Degree

(2)
Eigenvector

-0.0730
(0.101)

Excess Eigenvector Centrality
Ln(IPO proceeds)

0.414***
(0.0690)
0.0367
(0.0323)
-954,628***
(276,521)
0.0769
(0.221)
-0.00666***
(0.00222)
3.739***
(0.394)

Firm Size
Float ratio
CEO connected with banker
Firm age
Residual of initial return
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-0.238**
(0.0960)
0.424***
(0.0704)
0.0343
(0.0325)
-1.038e+06***
(273,534)
0.0975
(0.220)
-0.00671***
(0.00223)
3.767***
(0.396)

Table 10 Analysis of IPO Performance and Excess Centrality (Cont.)
Constant

-1.276***
(0.440)
782
0.169

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-1.279***
(0.444)
781
0.172

3.7 Robustness Analysis
3.7.1 Firm size effect
High centrality CEOs are more likely to manage larger firms. To control for the possibility that our
centrality variables proxy for potentially non-linear size effects, in unreported analysis we utilize three
methods used by El-Khatib et al. (2015): (a) we add a “large firm size” dummy, (b) we add a quadratic size
variables, and (c) we split our sample into two subsamples based on firm size, Regardless of the method
utilized, CEO centrality remains significant determinant of IPO underpricing (Table 4), likelihood of
positive price revisions (Table 5), and likelihood of positive insider IPO wealth effects (Table 6).
Consequently, it is unlikely that our findings are due to the firm size effect.
3.7.2 The impact of CEO overconfidence
Overconfident people may be more likely to build large personal networks. Consequently, high CEO
centrality may be positively related to overconfidence. Finance literature finds that overconfident CEOs
tend to make decisions that are not to the best interest of the shareholders. For example, Malmendier and
Tate (2008) and Roll (1986) find that CEO overconfidence may cause losses in mergers and acquisition.
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate the return of the investment
and overinvest. As our paper suggest that high-centrality CEOs may be associated with risky IPOs less
likely to generate benefits for existing shareholders, we need to address the potential positive link between
CEO centrality and overconfidence.
In order to separate CEO network effects (proxied by centrality) and overconfidence, in unreported
analysis, we include overconfidence measures in all of our models in Tables 4-6. The overconfidence
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measures are constructed following the models from Otto (2014) and Malmendier and Tate (2008).16 The
inclusion of any of the overconfidence measures does not change the signs and high significance levels of
the centrality coefficients. In addition, we uncover that overconfidence and centrality are negatively
correlated in our sample. Consequently, our results regarding the role of CEO centrality in the IPO process
are unlikely to be due to CEO overconfidence.
3.7.3 The impact of CEO age
It may be possible that our findings regarding CEO centrality may be due to firms trying to hire
experienced and “visible” CEO right before the firm’s IPO. Thus, in unreported analysis, we include CEO’s
age and years in position and interact with centrality measures in our models. The original centrality
determinants retain the same signs and very similar significances as those reported in Tables 4-6, while the
interactive coefficients are mostly insignificant. Moreover, we find that the coefficient for the years in
position is not statistically significant. Hence, we find evidence that our results are neither determined by
CEO tenure, nor driven by firms seeking high centrality CEOs right before IPO.
4. Conclusion
We show that CEO network centrality is statistically and economically meaningful determinant of IPO
outcomes. IPOs of firms with high centrality CEOs are associated with significantly greater underpricing
returns. These IPOs also have a lower likelihood of positive offer price adjustments from their initial filing
range, as well as a lower likelihood of generating positive net IPO wealth effects for the pre-IPO
shareholders. Our results suggest that new investors may perceive IPOs with well-connected CEOs as
riskier. In addition, we find that well-connected CEOs are less likely to be replaced in case of poor postIPO performance, consistent with higher entrenchment of high centrality CEOs in post IPO firms. Also, we
show that high centrality CEOs are more likely to sell company’s stock for personal benefit at the cost of
the shareholders, indicated by a lower abnormal return following their personal sales of the securities. These

16

Malmendier and Tate (2008) identify overconfident executives based on their decision to hold (rather than optimally
exercise) their in-the-money options. Otto (2014) utilizes firm’s voluntary earnings forecasts to classify overconfident
managers.
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findings are consistent with high centrality CEOs being able to utilize their influence and power derived
from higher positions within the social network hierarchy to entrench themselves and to thwart optimal
corporate governance. Last, we document additional risks associated with CEOs who network “inefficiently”
(that is, whose networks have many links, but lack influential connections). Namely, underpricing is higher,
and the chance of positive net wealth effects lower for IPOs with low eigenvector centrality CEOs, if they
also have high degree centralities.
We contribute to the growing literature on social networks in finance. Our paper is the first to show
that individual position within social network hierarchy – which leads to higher influence and power, and
can be proxied by social network centrality – affects IPO outcomes. We provide an extension of previous
research chiefly based on bilateral connections (e.g. Engelberg et al. 2012; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Cai and
Sevilir, 2012; Cohen et al., 2010). In addition, our results are consistent with detrimental impact of CEO
centrality on wealth of pre-IPO shareholders, and thus they provide an important contrast to existing
research on social networks in the context of IPO, which has so far mainly documented benefits of networks
due to bilateral connections between IPO managers and underwriters (Cooney et al., 2015), or due to high
firm-specific centrality of underwriters (Chuluun, 2015).

38

Chapter 2
Personal Connections, Financial Advisors, and M&A Outcomes
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1. Introduction
Merge and Acquisitions (M&A) are some of the most important decisions a firm’s leadership could
make, and they do not usually make the decisions on their own, but rather consult an outside advisor (Bao
& Edmans 2011). Given the substantial value implication that an M&A deal could have on the
shareholder, it is crucial that the financial advisor hired in the process could have effective functions in
assessing, negotiating, and executing or halt the deal. The firm’s leadership and the board should also
have a strong responsibility on the due diligence. Most importantly, such efforts from the financial
advisor and the firm should not be diminished by the potential conflict of interest or collusion as a result
of the social ties between the bidder firm’s leadership and that of the financial advisor. In this paper, we
examine how the personal social ties between a firm’s top leadership, which are CEO, CFO, COO, the
President, and the Chair of the Board, and those of the financial advisor affects the M&A performance of
the bidder firm.
Whether and how do financial advisors matter in a merge and acquisition deal? Finance literature has
much advances on this topic, but the results have not been conclusive. Bowers and Miller (1990) do not
find a relationship between value creation for the bidder and the choice of using a first-tier investment
banker. Servaes and Zenner (1996) find that the announcement returns for those firms hiring investment
banks are lower than those do not. On the other hand, however, more recent literature find that the
financial advisors do matter in an M&A or corporate takeover deal. Kale et al. (2003) document wealth
gains to the bidder as the reputation of the bidder advisor increases relative to that of the target advisor.
Bao and Edmans (2011) find a significant impact of the investment banks on M&A outcomes, contrasting
earlier studies. Golubov et al. (2012) document a significantly higher bidder announcement return, higher
success rate, and faster deal completion time that is associated with using a top-tier financial advisor in
M&A deals when the target is a public company.
We build on the findings of Golubov et al. (2012) and examine the impact of financial advisors on
M&A deals from the perspective of the social network, a topic that has been receiving increased attention
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in finance literature. Some literature find evidence showing that social ties have positive impact on M&A
and IPO outcomes. Cai and Sevilir (2012), using a sample of U.S. M&As, document that the
announcement returns are higher for those M&As where a common director is shared by the acquirer and
target company. Renneboog and Zhao (2014), with a U.K. sample, report that the board connection
between the acquirer and the target, measured as when there are one or more common directors exists, is
associated with a higher likelihood of success takeover and shorter period of time for negotiation. They,
however, do not find a significant impact of such connections on the announcement return. Cooney et al.
(2015) find that when the directors and the executives of the underwriter and the IPO firm are connected
through personal networks, the pre-IPO shareholders of the IPO firm are more likely to have a positive
wealth gain, and the investment bank receives a higher compensation and a greater share allocation of the
IPO firm, on average. Other literature document some negative or mixed impact of social networks on
M&As and corporate governance. El-Khatib et al. (2015) find that bidder CEOs that are in a more central
location of their personal connections are associated with more value losses to the acquirer and the
combined business entity. Schmidt (2015) asserts that the social ties between CEO and the board can
affect merger announcement return under different circumstances. He finds that when the value of board
advice is high, the social ties are associated with a higher announcement return, but on the other hand, he
finds that the social ties have a negative impact on acquirer performance, when the needs of high board
monitoring outweighs the benefit from board advising.
The financial advisors in an M&A deal are expected to play a role of certification (Allen et al. 2004).
More specifically, a financial advisor helps a buy-side client to collect information, evaluate a perspective
target, perform due diligence, assess the value impact of the acquisition on the buy side, and negotiate and
execute the deal if feasible. In other words, a deal should never be executed if it is deemed to be not
value-creating to the bidder. We assert that the prior social connections between the senior executive
members of the bidder and those of the financial advisor may impact the certification role of the financial
advisor and thus affect the performance of an M&A deal. One the one hand, literature has find that social
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connections facilitate transmission of private information, business idea, and knowledge. For example, an
extensive social network may facilitate the transmission of information among executives from different
business organizations and thus may help firms to score better loan contracts (Engelberg et al. 2012),
achieve better analyst performance (Cohen et al. 2010), improve portfolio management performance
(Cohen et al. 2008), gain better M&A synergies (Cai & Sevilir 2012), and have a better overall corporate
performance (Fracassi 2016).
On the other hand, however, social connections between the decision makers may interfere with
optimal decision making, corporate governance, and value creating for the shareholders. For example,
social ties among persons have been found to weaken the corporate governance and the monitoring
effects on the managers (Fracassi & Tate 2012), to increase transaction costs (Cai et al. 2016), to
encourage collusion among managers at the expenses of the shareholders (Ishii & Xuan 2014), and to
have a worse IPO outcome (Jandik et al. 2016).
The question remains unanswered is how the social connections between the acquirer and their
financial advisors affects the performance of an M&A deal. If the social connections between them help
the financial advisors better learn the private information of the bidder firm, then such connections should
help the financial advisor better certify and assess the deal, resulting in a better outcome. However, if
such social connections encourage collusion between the bidder and the advisor, where nonprofitable
deals are done, from which the advisors collect fees and CEO of the bidder firm enjoys a bigger power of
governance and monetary incentives, then the shareholder’s value would be destroyed, and such deals
would not be valued favorably by the financial market upon announcement.
We Use a sample of 675 M&A deals in the United States from 2000 to 2016 and use BoardEx to
identify personal connections from prior common work experience in public and private firms between
the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of Board of the bidder firms and those of bidder firms’
financial advisors. Our results show that the announcement returns of the deals with personal connection
between the bidders and their advisors are 1.59% lower than those of the deals where no such personal
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connection exist, which is a sizable difference given a -0.35% median bidder announcement CAR.
However, choosing a financial advisor is affected by deal characteristics (Francis et al. 2014), and that
which financial advisor to hire is a choice of the bidder firm, resulting in a potential selection bias
(Golubov et al. 2012). Therefore, we consider the endogeneity issues in the matching of bidder and their
advisor and control for the endogeneity by using the two-stage procedure proposed by Heckman (1979)
and the switching regression model with endogenous switching, an extension of Heckman (1979) model
used by Golubov et al. (2012). Our results show that, controlling for endogeneity, a bidder that personally
connects to their financial advisor would have done a better deal if the financial advisor was not
connected – or an 1.35% improvement in CAR. A non-connected bidder could have performed worse,
had they connected to their financial advisor – a -3.11% change in CAR. We also use the propensity score
matching proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to match each sample with bidder-bidder advisor
connections to a sample without such connection but has the closest propensity of having so. The results
show that the CAR of the sample with bidder-bidder financial advisor connection is 1.58% lower than
their matched sample. To further solidify the exclusion of endogeneity, we add an additional variable, the
number of professional associations in the headquarter county of the bidder, as a predictor of personal
connections between the bidder and their financial advisors. The number of professional associations in
the headquarter county of the bidder is significant in determining the personal connection, and the inverse
mills ratios we derive from the first stage of the Heckman procedure are not significant in the second
stage, nor are they significant in the switch regressions we subsequently perform. Thus, the negative
relations between the personal connection and the announcement CAR we find are not likely due to the
endogenous selection of the financial advisor by the bidder or due to the selection bias from the samples
that we observe.
We then investigate how personal connections between bidder and bidder financial advisors affect the
probability of completion of the deal and duration of time for deal completion. The results show that a
personal connection between the bidder and bidder advisor is positively associated with the likelihood of
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deal completion, and that for those completed deals where the target is a public company, the duration
between deal announcement and deal completion is 16.8% longer for those deals with bidder-bidder
advisor connections. These results indicate that deals with bidder-bidder advisor connections are more
likely to be taken into effective but are executed in a less efficient and timely manner.
We then further examine the possible channels that motivates the deals that are value-destroying to
the bidder shareholders. The financial advisors receive substantial amount of fees from the M&A deals
worldwide (Hunter & Jagtiani 2003; Golubov et al. 2012), and if a personal connection between the
bidder and bidder financial advisor prompts collusion, then the financial advisors are likely to be paid
more for advising the deal. Using data from 265 deals where the financial advisor fees are disclosed, we
find that the unconditional mean for the advisor fees paid by the bidder is 25.87 million US dollars when
the bidder and bidder advisor are personally connected, and 11.40 million when not connected. After
controlling for financial advisor reputation, deal and firm characteristics, following Golubov et al. (2012),
we, in a subsample of 121 deals with data availability, find that the fees paid by the bidders are 57.6%
higher when personal connections between bidder and bidder-advisor exist than those fees when no
personal connections exist, controlling for deal and firm characteristics. Our results provide evidence that
the premium fees paid by the bidder are not due to the quality and the reputation of the financial advisor,
nor due to the nature of the deal, but are due to the personal connections between the bidder and their
advisors.
Lastly, we investigate the impact of the personal connections between bidder and bidder financial
advisor and the cash bonus of the bidder CEO receives in the year the M&A deal completes. Literature
has documented that the CEOs of the acquiring firm commonly receive incentives following a successful
acquisition, and such incentives are almost all in the form of cash bonus (Grinstein & Hribar 2004).
Following Ishii and Xuan (2014), we focus on the cash bonus that the CEOs of the acquiring companies
receive in the year of merger completion. From the 350 deals where the cash bonus is paid to the CEO of
the acquiring company in the year the deal successfully completes, we show that unconditionally, the
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CEOs are paid 88.7% more cash bonus when there are personal connections between the bidder and
bidder financial advisors than when there are no such conditions. The ratio reduces to 48.2% when we
control for financial advisor reputation, deal characteristics, and firm financial of the year. Given an
average of 1.87 billion U.S. dollar cash bonus, our finding translates into about 900 thousand dollars more
cash bonus compensation for the CEOs when personal connections between the bidder and their financial
advisor exists, which is substantial.
Our results are robust under various of alternative model specification and controls. First, one concern
is that the significant results we find about the personal connections between the bidder and their advisor
and the outcome of the M&A deals is due to the proximity of the bidder and their advisor, not their actual
prior connections. Therefore, we always include the geographical difference between the bidder and their
advisor in all models to directly control for that, and all our results hold. Second, given that Golubov et al.
(2012) find that the reputation of the financial advisor matters in public deals, we include a dummy
variable indicating whether a deal is advised by a top financial advisor or not, and also include public
target dummy variable in our analysis. Our results still remain unchanged, and the interaction between the
bidder-bidder financial advisor connection and the top financial advisor does not appear to be significant
and affect our results. Third, our main results still hold if we either control for the fact whether the target
hires a financial advisor, or whether the personal connections between the target and their financial
advisor. Our results are also similar if we use different time window to estimate the CAR around the
merger announcement, or if we use different measures to control for the bidder size (Moeller et al. 2004).
Therefore, the results we find are not due to the geographical distance of the bidder and their advisors, the
connections or hiring of target advisor, or the size effect of the bidder.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we extend the literature of social ties in
finance and show the economic value of such connections. We show that the social ties of the senior
executives with the financial advisors matter in the M&A context. Our results suggest that such
connections are more detrimental than beneficial, which means they are more likely to help the executives
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and the financial advisors to score personal interests than earn economic benefits for the bidder
shareholders. Second, we are the first to investigate how the social connections between bidder and their
advisor may affect the outcome of M&A transactions. We add evidence to the M&A literature about
social ties that the connections between bidder and their advisor diminish the certification effect of the
advisor, resulting in more value-destroying deals. Lastly, we offer insights about how financial market
perceives such personal connections between corporate major decision makers and find that these
connections are perceived negatively by the market upon the announcement of the M&A deal.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, section 3 presents the empirical results,
and section 4 concludes.
2. Data
2.1 Social Connection Data
We obtain the social connection data of the acquirers and their financial advisors from BoardEx
through Wharton Research Data Services. BoardEx database records bilateral connections of the board
members and senior executives of the firms all over the world. Those connections include overlapping
private firms, public firms, government and military employment history, education, and social clubs.
BoardEx also contains the demographical information of the individuals the database includes. In our
paper, we consider the bidder firm is connected to their financial advisor if the CEO, CFO, COO,
President, or the Chair of the Board17 of either side has overlapped employment background in private or
public firm prior to the announcement year of the M&A transaction with the CEO, CFO, COO, President,
or the Chair of the Board of the other side. We only use the employment-based connection because such
connections are believed to be most reliable and trackable. Other types of connections like education are

17

Our results are similar if we only consider connections between CEO and CFO of the bidder and those of the
financial advisor.
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not reliable, considering the large enrollment of a public university18, where two individuals graduating in
the same year may not even have known each other throughout the 4 years of time attending the same
university.
2.2 M&A and Firm Characteristics
We obtain M&A data from Tomson Reuters SDC Database with the announcement date from 2000 to
2016, both acquirer and target being a United States firm. We exclude liquidations, bankruptcy
acquisition, going private, leverage buyout, privatization, restructuring and reverse takeover. We also
ensure that the samples are either a merger (code “M” in SDC), or acquisition of majority interest (code
“AM” in SDC). The deal should also have transaction value and payment methods non-missing.
Additionally, we require the bidder has stock return data available from CRSP and financial data available
from COMPUSTAT. We follow Golubov et al. (2012) and use SDC League Tables to identify the top 8
financial advisors19 by the value of the deal they advised during our sample period.
We then merge the social connection data with the M&A data. We only keep those M&A deals that
BoardEx has coverage for both acquirer firm and their financial advisors to ensure accuracy of our
connection data. We also exclude those deals where no financial advisor is used for the acquirer side. Our
final sample contains a total of 675 M&A deals. For the final sample, we use ExecuComp to collect the
data of the cash bonus of the CEO in the year of the M&A deal completion. We also use the data20 from
Rupasingha et al. (2006) for the measure of social capital capacity. We use the number of establishments
in professional organizations in the county of the acquirers’ headquarters as an additional determinant of
the connection between the acquirer and their advisor.

18

It is common for some large public universities to consistently have enrollment of more than 50,000 in any given
year in the most recent years. For example, Texas A&M University, the Ohio State University, Arizona State
University, and University of Central Florida, according to Wikipedia (2018).
19
The top 8 financial advisors are: JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs & Co, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Morgan
Stanley, Citi, Barclays, Credit Suisse Group, and Commerzbank AG.
20
The data is available from the website of Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development of The Pennsylvania
State University.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables in the analysis. Bidder Connection to
Advisor is a dummy variable that takes one if an employment-based personal connection between the
CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board exists between bidder and bidder financial advisor.
Bidder CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of the bidding firm from 2 days prior to to 2 days after the
announcement. Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the
top 8 financial advisors according to the League Table. Deal Size to Total Assets is the deal value
reported by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement.
Market Value is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to the announcement multiply by the
number of shares outstanding. Market Adjusted Runups is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the
bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Sigma is the standard
deviation of the daily stock return of the bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the
announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the
deal, and 0 otherwise. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity (price per share at
the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total
liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided by the book value of the total assets.
Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Liquidity is the cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income
before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common and preferred stock divided by
the number of shares outstanding times the closing stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the
announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that takes one if the bidder and the target are in
the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer is a dummy variable that takes one if the
offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Target is Public is a dummy that takes one if the target firm is a
listed company, and zero otherwise. Distance between Bidder and Advisor is the direct distance between
the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Deal Completion is a dummy variable that takes one if
the deal is eventually effective as shown in the SDC and zero otherwise. Bidder Advisor Fee is the fee
paid to the bidder advisor reported by SDC. CEO Cash Bonus is the cash bonus received by the CEO of
the bidder in the year the M&A deal completes. Days to Resolution if Success is the number of calendar
days from the announcement date to the effective date for the deals bid by a listed firm.
N

Mean

p10

p50

p90

Standard
Deviation

675

0.21

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.41

675

0.00

-0.09

0.00

0.09

0.08

675

0.62

0.00

1.00

1.00

0.49

675

2.03

0.02

0.19

0.91

34.11

675

22.09

0.64

4.65

64.04

48.54

Market Adjusted Runups

675

0.12

-0.25

0.05

0.46

0.51

Sigma

675

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.01

Unit
Bidder Connection to Advisor

Binary

Bidder CAR
Top Advisor Hired

Binary

Deal Size to Total Assets
Market Value

Cash Payment Used

Billion $

675

0.83

0.00

1.00

1.00

0.38

ROA

Binary

675

0.06

0.00

0.06

0.14

0.09

Tobin’s Q

675

2.25

1.08

1.74

3.79

2.09

Leverage

675

0.22

0.00

0.19

0.47

0.19

Liquidity

675

0.07

0.00

0.06

0.15

0.10

Same Industry Deal

Binary

675

0.67

0.00

1.00

1.00

0.47

Tender Offer

Binary

675

0.17

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.38

Target is Public

Binary

675

0.70

0.00

1.00

1.00

0.46
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Table 1 Summary Statistics (Cont.)
Unit

N

Mean

p10

p50

p90

Standard
Deviation

Distance between Bidder and Advisor

Miles

675

932.10

19.78

706.10

2,461.00

874.90

Deal Completion

Binary

675

0.89

0.00

1

1

0.31

Bidder Advisor Fee

Million $

265

13.75

0.58

8.00

35.00

16.03

CEO Cash Bonus

Million $

350

1.91

0.18

1.05

5.00

2.86

406

122.4

43

101

240

79.58

Days to Resolution if Success

The summary statistics of our final sample is presented in Table 1. 21% of our sample has bidderbidder financial advisor connections, and 62% of our sample have been advised by a top bidder financial
advisor. The average direct distance between a typical bidder and their advisor is 932 miles. A typical
deal in our sample as an announcement CAR of 0.04%, a deal value to total asset of 2.03, a market
adjustment runup from 205 days to 6 days prior to the announcement of 11.65%, and a standard deviation
of the daily stock return during the same period of 2.04%. 67% of the sample deals are same-industry deal
where the bidder and the target are in the same industry, 17% of the deals are tender offers, 70% of the
deals involve a public target, and 83% of the deals involve cash payment. A typical bidder in our sample
has a total market value of 22.1 billion U.S. dollars, based on the stock price 4 weeks prior to the
announcement date, a return on asset of 5.75%, a Tobin’s Q of 2.25, a leverage of 0.22, and a cash flow to
equity ratio of 6.97%, all based on the Compustat data in the year prior to the announcement year. Based
on the SDC data availability, the bidder advisor fees are disclosed in 265 deals, of which the mean advisor
fee is 13.75 million U.S. dollars. 350 CEOs are reported to have received cash bonus in the year the M&A
deal is complete, and the mean bonus is 1.91 million U.S. dollars. It takes a typical deal with a public
target 122 days to resolve, if the deal is eventually complete.
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Bidder-Bidder Financial Advisor Connections and Bidder CAR
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We first examine how the connections between bidder and their advisor affect the announcement
CAR of the bidder. According to the prior literature, we control for the deal and firm characteristics that
have found to impact bidder announcement CAR. We control for the bidder size (Moeller et al. 2004),
Tobin’s q (Lang et al. 1989; Servaes 1991), leverage (Maloney et al. 1993; Billett et al. 2004),
profitability (Lang et al. 1991), and cash flow to equity ratio (Jensen 1986; Lang et al. 1991; Smith &
Kim 1994). We also control for bidder financial advisor reputation, which is related to the bidder CAR
according to Golubov et al. (2012). The bidder size is measured as the market value of the bidder 4 weeks
prior to the announcement date. The Tobin’s q is measured as the sum of the book value of debt and
market value of equity divided by total asset. The leverage is the total debt to total asset ratio. The
profitability is the return on asset. The cash flow to equity ratio is measured as the income before
extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common stock and preferred stock divided by
the total market value of the equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. All these firm
financial data is based on the fiscal year end immediately prior to the announcement year. We also control
for the M&A deal related characteristics that may affect bidder CAR, which are relative deal size (Fuller
et al. 2002), bidder stock run-ups (Rosen 2006), bidder stock return volatility (Moeller et al. 2007), cash
payment being used (Travlos 1987), same-industry deal (Morck et al. 1990), tender offer (Jensen &
Ruback 1983), and target firm being public (Golubov et al. 2012). Relative deal size is the natural
logarithm of deal value to the bidder total assets. The bidder stock runups is the market adjust return of
the bidder stock during 205 to 6 days prior to the announcement date. The bidder stock return volatility is
the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the bidder during 205 to 6 days prior to the
announcement date. The cash payment being used is a dummy that takes 1 if cash is used to pay for the
acquisition and 0 otherwise. Same-industry deal is a dummy that takes 1 if the acquirer and the target are
in the same industry, and 0 other wise. The target firm being public is a dummy that takes 1 if the target is
a publicly traded firm and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Bidder Announcement CAR
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CAR (-2,2) around the announcement
date. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return of the bidding firm from 2 days prior to to
2 days after the announcement. Bidder Connection to Advisor is a dummy variable that takes one if an
employment-based personal connection between the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board
exists between bidder and bidder financial advisor. Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes one
if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors according to the League Table. Relative Deal
Size is the natural logarithm of deal value reported by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm in the
year prior to the M&A announcement. Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to
the announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups is the
market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the
announcement. Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the
bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy
variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on
assets of the bidder in the year prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the
market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by
the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided
by the book value of the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the
cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus
dividends on common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing
stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that
takes one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer
is a dummy variable that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Target is Public is a
dummy that takes one if the target firm is a listed company, and zero otherwise. Bidder-bidder Advisor
Distance is the direct distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. All models
include year and industry fixed effect. Robust standard errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in
the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable = CAR (-2, +2)
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.0166**
(0.00752)

-0.0164**
(0.00757)
-0.00153
(0.00782)
-0.00170
(0.00310)
-1.09e-07**
(5.29e-08)
-0.000116
(0.0114)
0.119
(0.471)
0.0224**
(0.00992)
0.0212
(0.0616)

-0.0159**
(0.00762)
0.000996
(0.00788)
3.86e-05
(0.00313)
-7.81e-08
(5.10e-08)
-0.000791
(0.0116)
-0.0756
(0.476)
0.0194**
(0.00969)
0.0180
(0.0599)

Top Financial Advisor Dummy
Relative Deal Size
Bidder Size
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups
Bidder Stock Return Volatility
Cash Payment Used
ROA

-0.00173
(0.00307)
-1.10e-07**
(5.26e-08)
-4.09e-05
(0.0114)
0.127
(0.471)
0.0224**
(0.00992)
0.0207
(0.0615)
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Table 2 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Bidder Announcement CAR (Cont.)
Dependent variable = CAR (-2, +2)
Tobin's Q
Leverage
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio
Same Industry Deal
Tender Offer

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.00228
(0.00196)
0.0329
(0.0226)
0.0543
(0.0483)
0.00679
(0.00703)
0.00405
(0.00778)

-0.00225
(0.00198)
0.0330
(0.0227)
0.0541
(0.0483)
0.00673
(0.00704)
0.00401
(0.00779)

-1.01e-06
(4.22e-06)
-0.0632*
(0.0329)

-9.91e-07
(4.25e-06)
-0.0625*
(0.0322)

-0.00238
(0.00195)
0.0325
(0.0223)
0.0529
(0.0492)
0.00869
(0.00700)
0.0140*
(0.00837)
-0.0246***
(0.00856)
-7.69e-08
(4.24e-06)
-0.0560
(0.0367)

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

675
0.073

675
0.071

675
0.086

Target is Public
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance
Constant

Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The regression results are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable CAR (-2,2) is the cumulative
abnormal return of the bidder from 2 days prior to the announcement date to 2 days after that. Year and
industry fixed effect are included in all models, and the heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are
reported in the parentheses. Column (1) presents our base model, where only the bidder financial
characteristics and deal characteristics are included. The variable of interest is Bidder-bidder Advisor
Connection, which is statistically significant and negative. This indicates that the existence of bidderbidder financial advisor connection negatively impacts the bidder CAR. We add control for top financial
advisor dummy in column (2) and target firm being public dummy in column (3), as Golubov et al.
(2012) find that those two factors matter in bidder CAR. Our key variable, Bidder-bidder Advisor
Connection, is still negatively significant with those two controls. The coefficient in the column (3)
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suggest that the connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor makes the bidder CAR 1.59%
lower than if there was no connection exists. Other variables related to firm financial characteristics and
deal characteristics are generally in the same directions as previous literature has predicted. Overall, our
initial results indicate that the connection between bidder and their financial advisor has a negative impact
on bidder CAR.
3.2 Determinants of Bidder-Bidder Financial Advisor Connection and Selection Bias
Correction
Note that the results we find above assume that the connection between the bidder and their advisors
are exogenously determined, which is plausible. In fact, such connection could also be determined
endogenously by the firm characteristics and the deal characteristics. Furthermore, such connection can
be affected by the availability of the financial advisor in the proximity of the bidder firm. If these
suspicions hold true, there could be a selection bias exists, and the results we produce above could thus be
unreliable, according to Heckman (1979). Therefore, we follow similar approach used by Golubov et al.
(2012) using a two-step procedure to correct and control for the self-selection bias and endogeneity.
In the first step we implement a probit model that predicts the likelihood of a connection exists
between the bidder and bidder financial advisor. In the second stage, we use the inverse mills ratio
derived from the first stage to correct the selection bias. Li and Prabhala (2007) suggest that it is ideal to
include a variable in the first stage, but the same variable does not appear in the second stage. In other
words, that variable should have an impact on the likelihood of the existence of a bidder-bidder financial
advisor connection but does not have an impact on the outcome of the M&A transaction. We therefore
include the number of establishments in professional organizations in the county of the acquirers’
headquarters as an additional determinant of the connection between the bidder and their advisor. We
argue that more professional organizations in the county of the acquirer’s headquarter offer greater
opportunities for the firm’s executive members to participate in more social events, engage in more
business and employment activities, and thus increases the chance that they involve a financial advisor
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that they have connection with in the M&A deal. However, the number of professional organizations in
an area is unlikely to affect the performance of the firm in the M&A transaction.
The column (1) of Table 3 reports the results of the probit model that estimates the likelihood of a
connection between the bidder and their financial advisor. The Number of Professional Organizations
variable is highly significant (at the 5% level), indicating the number of professional associations in the
proximity of the headquarter of the bidder is positively related to the likelihood of the existence of bidderbidder financial advisor connection. The relative deal size is negatively associated with the probability of
hiring a connected financial advisor, implying that those deals that are more important to the bidder are
less likely to involve a connected financial advisor, likely because the negative effect of hiring a
connected financial advisor is easily to be noticed due to the relative size of the deal to the bidder. The
bidder size is positively related to hiring a connected financial advisor, and the advisor being a top banker
is also positively associated with the probability of being included as a connected financial advisor.
The columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 report the second stage of the Heckman procedure. In the second
stage, we add an inverse Mills ratio, derived from the first stage of the Heckman procedure, as an
additional independent variable. The column (2) represents the base model of our analysis, and the
column (3) represents the model that includes the financial advisor reputation variable and the dummy
indicating the target firm being public. The coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio in both models are not
significant, indicating that there is no evidence of self-selection bias in our initial analysis. Nevertheless,
we follow Golubov et al. (2012) and implement a switching regression approach with endogenous
switching to estimate the effect of a connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor on the bidder
CAR. More specifically, we examine what the CAR would have been, if the M&A deal, which actually
has bidder-bidder financial advisor connection, had been announced without the existence of bidderbidder financial advisor connection? Also, what the CAR could have been, if the deal without bidderbidder financial advisor connection had been announced with a connection between bidder and bidder
financial advisor? We answer these two what-if questions by estimating OLS models on bidder CAR on
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subsamples with and without bidder-bidder financial advisor connections, respectively, with the inverse
Mills ratio we derived in the probit model described above included in all models. Table 4 Panel A
reports the results of the switching regression models, and Panel B reports the results of the what-if
analysis.
Table 3 Heckman Two-stage Regression for Bidder Announcement CAR
This table reports the Heckman (1979) two-stage regression for bidder announcement CAR. The
dependent variable of the column (1) is a dummy that takes one if a bidder-financial advisor connection
exists and zero otherwise. The column (1) is a probit model that predicts the likelihood of the completion
of a deal. The columns (2) and (3) are OLS regression models. The dependent variables of the columns
(2) and (3) are the bidder CAR (-2,2) around the announcement date. The Inverse Mills Ratio is derived
using model (1) and is included in models (2) and (3). Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes
one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors according to the League Table. Relative
Deal Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value reported by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm
in the year prior to the M&A announcement. Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks
prior to the announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups
is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after
the announcement. Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the
bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy
variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on
assets of the bidder in the year prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the
market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by
the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided
by the book value of the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the
cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus
dividends on common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing
stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that
takes one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer
is a dummy variable that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Target is Public is a
dummy that takes one if the target firm is a listed company, and zero otherwise. Bidder-bidder Advisor
Distance is the direct distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust standard
errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable

(1)
Prob(Connection Exists)

Inverse Mills Ratio
Top Financial Advisor Dummy
Relative Deal Size

0.455***
(0.133)
-0.127**
(0.0543)
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(2)
CAR (-2, +2)

(3)
CAR (-2, +2)

0.00476
(0.0175)

-0.0285
(0.0339)
-0.0112
(0.0152)
0.00371
(0.00508)

-0.00177
(0.00346)

Table 3 Heckman Two-stage Regression for Bidder Announcement CAR (Cont.)
Dependent Variable
Bidder Size

(1)
Prob(Connection Exists)

(2)
CAR (-2, +2)

(3)
CAR (-2, +2)

3.87e-06***
(1.32e-06)

-1.16e-07
(7.18e-08)
-0.000475
(0.0112)
0.120
(0.482)
0.0229**
(0.0101)
0.0264
(0.0667)
-0.00249
(0.00261)
0.0325
(0.0231)
0.0495
(0.0475)
0.00629
(0.00709)
0.00381
(0.00782)
3.78e-07
(4.20e-06)

0.0346
(0.131)
0.00183**
(0.000925)
-0.884**
(0.390)

-1.72e-07*
(9.86e-08)
-0.00122
(0.0116)
-0.0713
(0.488)
0.0239**
(0.0105)
-0.0233
(0.0736)
0.00117
(0.00430)
0.0276
(0.0227)
0.0509
(0.0482)
0.00852
(0.00707)
0.0137
(0.00844)
1.49e-06
(4.24e-06)
-0.0257***
(0.00860)

-0.0702*
(0.0407)

-0.0218
(0.0556)

N
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

675
0.106

675
0.067

675
0.081

Bidder Market Adjusted Runups
Bidder Stock Return Volatility
Cash Payment Used
ROA
Tobin's Q
Leverage
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio
Same Industry Deal

-0.150
(0.167)
1.635
(1.000)
-0.125**
(0.0612)
0.272
(0.306)
0.00735
(0.593)
-0.0278
(0.123)

Tender Offer
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance
Target is Public
Number of Professional Organizations
Constant

Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Observations
Pseudo R-squared/Adjusted R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4 Switching Regression Model for Bidder Announcement CAR, What-if Analysis, and
Propensity Score Matching
Table 4 reports the results of the switching regression model for bidder announcement CAR in Panel A,
what-if analysis in Panel B, and propensity score matching in Panel C. The dependent variables in Panel
A are bidder announcement CAR (-2,+2), where columns (1) and (2) are based on the subsample that a
bidder-bidder financial advisor connection exists, and that columns (3) and (4) are based on the
subsample that no such connection exists. The Inverse Mills Ratio is derived using model (1) in Table 3.
Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial
advisors according to the League Table. Relative Deal Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value
reported by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement.
Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to the announcement multiply by the
number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold
return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Bidder Stock
Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the bidding firm from 205 days
before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy variable that takes one if cash is
used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on assets of the bidder in the year prior
to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity (price per share at
the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total
liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided by the book value of the total assets.
Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated
as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common and preferred
stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing stock price at the fiscal year-end
prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that takes one if the bidder and the
target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer is a dummy variable that takes
one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Target is Public is a dummy that takes one if the target
firm is a listed company, and zero otherwise. Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance is the direct distance
between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust standard errors correcting
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Switching Regression Model for Bidder Announcement CAR
Dependent variable = CAR (-2, +2)
(1)
(2)
Connection Exists Connection Exists
Inverse Mills Ratio

-0.0292
(0.0433)

Top Financial Advisor Dummy
Relative Deal Size
Bidder Size
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups
Bidder Stock Return Volatility

0.00402
(0.00792)
-8.10e-08
(1.87e-07)
-0.0358
(0.0358)
0.126
(1.335)
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0.0365
(0.106)
0.0413
(0.0468)
-0.000799
(0.0114)
1.28e-07
(3.06e-07)
-0.0290
(0.0339)
-0.0615
(1.352)

(3)
No Connection

(4)
No Connection

0.00289
(0.0204)

-0.0651
(0.0411)
-0.0274
(0.0184)
0.00413
(0.00572)
-3.19e-07**
(1.47e-07)
-0.00111
(0.0135)
0.246
(0.534)

-0.00519
(0.00381)
-1.59e-07
(9.75e-08)
0.000290
(0.0130)
0.361
(0.532)

Table 4 Switching Regression Model for Bidder Announcement CAR, What-if Analysis, and
Propensity Score Matching (Cont.)
Dependent variable = CAR (-2, +2)
Cash Payment Used
ROA
Tobin's Q
Leverage
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio
Same Industry Deal
Tender Offer
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance

(1)
Connection Exists
0.0138
(0.0228)
-0.287*
(0.157)
0.00242
(0.00742)
0.130
(0.103)
-0.297***
(0.0982)
0.0453***
(0.0134)
0.0239
(0.0183)
6.60e-06
(1.38e-05)

(3)
No Connection
0.0229**
(0.0116)
0.0404
(0.0757)
-0.00264
(0.00302)
0.0165
(0.0259)
0.109*
(0.0604)
-0.00296
(0.00845)
0.00234
(0.00937)
-2.16e-06
(4.85e-06)

-0.0349
(0.0999)

(2)
Connection Exists
-0.00327
(0.0263)
-0.129
(0.155)
-0.00477
(0.0156)
0.145
(0.0913)
-0.279***
(0.0940)
0.0397***
(0.0130)
0.0396*
(0.0207)
1.08e-05
(1.43e-05)
-0.0456*
(0.0231)
-0.120
(0.165)

-0.0506
(0.0482)

(4)
No Connection
0.0284**
(0.0126)
-0.0575
(0.0854)
0.00507
(0.00508)
0.00700
(0.0256)
0.117*
(0.0609)
0.000471
(0.00840)
0.0112
(0.0102)
-1.22e-06
(4.86e-06)
-0.0234**
(0.00958)
0.0387
(0.0660)

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

142
0.196

142
0.251

533
0.065

533
0.078

Target is Public
Constant

Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: What-if Analysis
Actual CAR (1)
Hypothetical CAR (2)
Improvement ((1) – (2))
N

Connection Exists
-1.043%
0.311%
1.354%**
142

No Connection
0.331%
-2.779%
-3.109%***
533

Panel C: Propensity Score Matching Analysis
Subsample that Connection Exists (1)
Actual CAR
-1.043%
(1) – (2)
-1.579%**
N
142

Matched Sample without Connection (2)
0.536%
142

We show that the inverse Mills ratios are still insignificant in all subsample models presented in Panel
A. We then compute the hypothetical CAR of those samples with bidder-bidder financial advisor
connection by applying the coefficients of the “no connection” model to the actual data of the “connection
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exists” samples. Similarly, we compute the hypothetical CAR of those samples without bidder-bidder
financial advisor connection by applying the coefficients of the “connection exists” model to the actual
data of the “no connection” samples. The comparison between the actual CAR and the hypothetical CAR,
as a what-if analysis using the models (2) and (4) in the Panel A of Table 4, is presented in the Panel B of
Table 421. We show that those M&A deals with connections between the bidder and bidder financial
advisor would have improve the announcement CAR by 1.35%, if there is no such connection exists. On
the other hand, the M&A deals announced without a bidder-bidder financial advisor connection would
have been worsened by 3.11% in terms of the announcement CAR had they chosen a connected financial
advisor. Both numbers are statistically and economically significant, given an average (median) CAR of
0.04% (-0.35%).
Furthermore, we implement the propensity score matching technique proposed by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) to match each M&A deal that involves a connected financial advisor with one that does not
by the closest probability of involving a connected financial advisor. The probability of involving a
connected financial advisor is estimated using the same probit model presented in Table 3 column (1). We
then compare the actual CAR of the subsample that a connection exists with the actual CAR of the
matched sample without connections. The results are shown in Table 4 Panel C. We show that the CAR
of the “connection exists” sample is 1.58% lower than that of the matched sample. The difference is
statistically significant at the 5% level.
Overall, we present evidence showing that involving a financial advisor whose top executive leaders
have prior employment connections with those of the bidder has a significant negative impact on the
bidder CAR, and that such impact is statistically and economically meaningful, which is unlikely to be
caused by self-selection bias.

21

The comparison using the models in column (1) and (3) of Table 4 Panel A yields similar magnitudes and
significance.
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3.3 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Deal Completion
We then investigate if the connection between bidder and bidder advisor helps the bidder to score a
higher odd of complete the deal. Particularly, using a probit model, we estimate the probability of a deal
completion on the connection between bidder and bidder advisor, bidder characteristics, and deal
characteristics. We construct the model following Golubov et al. (2012) and El-Khatib et al. (2015), and
the results are shown in Table 5. Consistent with prior literature, high profitability, growth opportunity
and low leverage bidders are more likely to complete the deal. In model (1), we show that bidder-bidder
financial advisor connections has a positive impact on the likelihood of completing a deal, and that deal
size to total assets ratio also has a positive impact, which is different from Golubov et al. (2012). Hence,
we add an interaction term between bidder-bidder advisor connection and the deal size to total assets ratio
in model (2). The coefficient shows a significant negative impact of the interaction term22. These results
indicate that while a connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor may positively impact the
likelihood of a deal completion, such impact is reduced, when the deal is relatively larger and thus more
important to the bidder, or the bidder is a larger firm. This is consistent with the reputation effect of the
social network argued by Jandik et al. (2016) that as the M&A deal becomes more noticeable, the
influence of the personal connection between the bidder and their financial advisor on the deal, especially
when a deal may more likely to be value destroying as we find in the previous section, is diminished.

22

We obtain similar results of negative impact of the interaction term when interacting the deal size to total assets
with the bidder size.
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Table 5 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Deal Completion
Table 5 reports the result of the probit model that predicts the likelihood of a deal completion. The
dependent variables are the dummy variables that take one if a deal is eventually effective as recorded by
SDC, and zero otherwise. Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection is a dummy variable that takes one if an
employment-based personal connection between the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board
exists between bidder and bidder financial advisor. Deal Size to Total Assets is the deal value reported by
SDC divided by the total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement. Top Advisor
Hired is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors
according to the League Table. Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to the
announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups is the
market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the
announcement. Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the
bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy
variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on
assets of the bidder in the year prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the
market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by
the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided
by the book value of the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the
cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus
dividends on common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing
stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that
takes one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer
is a dummy variable that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Bidder-bidder Advisor
Distance is the direct distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust standard
errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable = Prob (Deal Completion)
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection
Deal Size to Total Assets

(1)

(2)

0.323*
(0.179)
0.00205*
(0.00121)

0.648***
(0.218)
0.00223*
(0.00130)
-0.760***
(0.283)
0.0254
(0.151)
-3.31e-06***
(1.22e-06)
0.0799
(0.131)
4.732
(7.014)
0.300
(0.187)
2.419***
(0.867)

Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection* Deal Size to Total Assets
Top Advisor Hired

0.00685
(0.149)
-3.06e-06**
(1.20e-06)
0.0838
(0.133)
3.526
(6.800)
0.307
(0.187)
2.323***
(0.848)

Bidder Size
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups
Bidder Stock Return Volatility
Cash Payment Used
ROA
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Table 5 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Deal Completion (Cont.)
Dependent variable = Prob (Deal Completion)
Tobin's Q
Leverage
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio
Same Industry Deal
Tender Offer
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance
Constant

Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)

(2)

0.0695
(0.0433)
-0.355
(0.388)
-0.485
(0.735)
0.115
(0.139)
-0.185
(0.186)
-8.14e-05
(8.30e-05)
0.819*
(0.431)

0.0694
(0.0426)
-0.344
(0.393)
-0.430
(0.755)
0.150
(0.141)
-0.199
(0.189)
-9.09e-05
(8.38e-05)
0.744*
(0.440)

N
Y

N
Y

675
0.0901

675
0.101

3.4 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Deal Resolution Time
In this section, we examine whether a connection between the bidder and bidder advisor may shorten
or lengthen the time from deal announcement to deal being effective. We are interested in this question
because if a connection between the bidder and bidder financial advisor may facilitate the information
transmission, a deal should be resolved faster, exhibiting a high efficiency of the deal execution. Golubov
et al. (2012) argue that a shorter time between the deal announcement and deal resolution indicates the
“skill effect” of a reputable financial advisor. In fact, they find that deals worked by reputable financial
advisors indeed take a shorter time to resolve, consistent with their expected skill and efficiency.
Therefore, we control for the top financial advisor in our analysis. Officer et al. (2009) argue that the
resolution time for M&A deals is less important to consider when target is a private firm because private
target deals are typically announced when done. Therefore, we only use the observations where the target
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firm is a public firm and the deal is finally completed in this analysis. The results of the OLS estimation is
reported in Table 6.
Table 6 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Time to Resolution
This table reports the OLS regression of the time to resolution on bidder-bidder advisor connection and
other control variables. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of number of days from the
announcement day to the day that the deal is effective as reported by SDC database. Bidder-bidder
Advisor Connection is a dummy variable that takes one if an employment-based personal connection
between the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board exists between bidder and bidder
financial advisor. Relative Deal Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value reported by SDC divided
by the total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement. Top Advisor Hired is a dummy
variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors according to the
League Table. Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to the announcement
multiply by the number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups is the market-adjusted
buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement.
Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the bidding firm from
205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy variable that takes
one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on assets of the bidder in
the year prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity
(price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by the number of shares
outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided by the book value of
the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the cash flows-to-equity
ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common
and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing stock price at the fiscal
year-end prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that takes one if the bidder
and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer is a dummy variable
that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance is the direct
distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust standard errors correcting
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable = Ln(Days to Resolution)
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.186***
(0.0705)

0.187***
(0.0711)
-0.00432
(0.0628)

0.168***
(0.0615)
-0.0730
(0.0594)
0.143***
(0.0297)
2.79e-06***
(5.67e-07)
0.0229
(0.0766)
-1.178
(3.901)

Top Advisor Hired
Relative Deal Size
Bidder Size
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups
Bidder Stock Return Volatility
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Table 6 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Time to Resolution (Cont.)
Dependent Variable = Ln(Days to Resolution)

(1)

(2)

(3)

4.593***
(0.0332)

4.595***
(0.0519)

-0.0205
(0.0654)
0.280
(0.367)
-0.00992
(0.0184)
0.220
(0.153)
-0.0213
(0.277)
0.105**
(0.0526)
-0.544***
(0.0657)
-2.50e-05
(2.83e-05)
4.386***
(0.176)

N
Y

N
Y

N
Y

406
0.015

406
0.013

406
0.341

Cash Payment Used
ROA
Tobin's Q
Leverage
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio
Same Industry Deal
Tender Offer
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance
Constant

Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The dependent variable is log of resolution days between announcement and taking into effect.
Column (1) of Table 6 reports the unconditional impact of bidder-bidder advisor connection on resolution
time and shows that a connection is associated with a longer time to resolution. In column (2), we add
control for top financial advisors, and in column (3) additional controls for firm and deal characteristics.
We show that the connection between bidder and bidder advisor is consistently positively significant. The
coefficient of top advisor is negative, which is consistent with Golubov et al. (2012), but not significant.
Based on the model in column (3), we find that all else equal, a deal will take 16.8% longer time to
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resolve, if a connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor exists23, which is both statistically
and economically significant. Overall, we find evidence showing that the deals advised by financial
advisor with personal connections to the bidder take a longer time to resolve, controlling for advisor
reputation, firm and deal characteristics. This implies that instead of utilizing the better information
transmission benefited from personal connections, those connected financial advisors work inefficiently
in those M&A deals in terms of the time to resolution.
3.5 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection, Advisor Fees, and CEO Bonus
Given the results discussed above, we have shown that a personal connection between the bidder and
their financial advisor is detrimental. It causes value loss to the shareholder at the M&A deal
announcement, takes longer time to resolve, but has a higher likelihood to complete. It is therefore
interesting to examine the motivation behind that, and study how the both sides of the connection benefit
from the deal. Hence, we investigate whether the financial advisors are paid more fees, and the bidder
CEOs are paid more bonus because of the personal connection between bidder and bidder financial
advisor.
Corporates pay substantial amount of fees to their advisors, but such fees are not required by SEC to
be disclosed in a M&A deals. As a result, we present the OLS regression model that estimates the advisor
fees based on the 265 deals for which the advisor fee information is available in SDC database and
bidder-bidder financial advisor connection information is available in BoardEx database. Table 7 shows
the results. Model (1) shows the unconditional regression of log of advisor fees on the connection
between bidder and their financial advisor. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant. In
Model (2), we add a control variable for top advisors, which has a positive and significant coefficient,
consistent with Golubov et al. (2012). The coefficient of bidder-bidder financial advisor connection is still
positively significant. In Model (3), on top of the bidder-bidder financial advisor connection and top

23

In unreported results, we find that all else equal, a deal takes 18.1 more days to resolve if there is a connection
between bidder and bidder financial advisor, compared to one that with no such connection exists.
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advisors, we control for firm and deal characteristics that will affect advisor fees following prior
literature. The bidder-bidder financial advisor connection is still positive and statistically significant. Our
results are also economically significant. Controlling for deal and firm characteristics, the financial
advisors with personal connection to the bidder are paid 57.6% higher than those without a personal
connection, which is substantial, considering the median payment to the advisor in our sample being 8
million U.S. dollars24.
Table 7 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Advisor Fees
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder financial advisor fees on the bidderfinancial advisor connection and other control variables. The dependent variables are the natural
logarithm of advisor fees paid to bidder financial advisor as reported by SDC database. Bidder-bidder
Advisor Connection is a dummy variable that takes one if an employment-based personal connection
between the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board exists between bidder and bidder
financial advisor. Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of
the top 8 financial advisors according to the League Table. Deal size is the deal value recorded by SDC
database. Relative Deal Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value reported by SDC divided by the
total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy
variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on
assets of the bidder in the year prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that
takes one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer
is a dummy variable that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Bidder Market Adjusted
Runups is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6
days after the announcement. Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock
return of the bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Distance between
Bidder and Advisor is the direct distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust
standard errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable = ln(Advisor Fees)
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection

(1)

(2)

(3)

1.224***
(0.184)

0.922***
(0.183)
1.508***
(0.165)

0.576**
(0.287)
0.957***
(0.295)
1.96e-05**
(8.10e-06)
0.271**
(0.104)

Top Financial Advisor Dummy
Deal Size
Relative Deal Size

24

In unreported analysis, using raw advisor fees as dependent variable, and find that the financial advisors with
personal connections to the bidder are, on average, paid 10.3 million dollars more than those without personal
connections, controlling for deal and firm financial characteristics.
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Table 7 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Advisor Fees (Cont.)
Dependent Variable = ln(Advisor Fees)

(1)

(2)

(3)

8.523***
(0.102)

7.667***
(0.142)

-0.0213
(0.262)
0.0263
(0.244)
-0.174
(0.616)
-0.259
(0.277)
-28.67**
(10.97)
1.00e-05
(0.000122)
7.513***
(0.581)

265
0.086

265
0.319

121
0.396

Cash Payment Used
Same Industry Deal
Tender Offer
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups
Bidder Stock Return Volatility
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CEOs usually get cash bonus as a monetary incentive following a successful M&A deal (Grinstein &
Hribar 2004). We follow Ishii and Xuan (2014) and therefore focus on the cash bonus that the CEOs of
the bidding firm receive in the year that the M&A deal completes. Using the 350 M&A deals that finally
complete and report a non-zero CEO bonus in the deal completion year, we implement OLS regression of
the log of CEO cash bonus on the connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor. Unlike in
previous analysis where firm financials are lagged one year, we use the same year firm financial
characteristics in this analysis. The OLS regression results are shown in Table 8. We show the
unconditional model in column (1) and control for the top financial advisor in model (2), where the
bidder-bidder financial advisor connection is positive and highly significant in both models. In model (3)
we add additional deal and firm financial characteristics, and in model (4) we add the stock return and
volatility. The results show that the bidder-bidder advisor connection is consistently positive and
significant in predicting CEO bonus. High stock return, larger firms, low stock volatility are also
associated with higher CEO bonus, which is consistent with prior literature. Our results are economically
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significant as well. The CEOs in the firms where executive leaderships have personal connections to the
financial advisors get paid 41.4% more in cash bonus, on average, in the acquisition completion year than
those in the firms without such personal connections25.
Table 8 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and CEO Bonus
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of CEO bonus on the bidder-bidder financial advisor
connection and other control variables. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the bidding
firm’s CEO cash bonus in the year the deal is complete. Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection is a dummy
variable that takes one if an employment-based personal connection between the CEO, CFO, COO,
President and Chair of the Board exists between bidder and bidder financial advisor. Top Advisor Hired is
a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors according to
the League Table. Total assets is the book value of total assets of the firm. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the
sum of the market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement
multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock,
all divided by the book value of the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity
Ratio is the cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus
depreciation minus dividends on common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares
outstanding times the closing stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. All firm
financial data are at the end of the fiscal year that the deal completes. Tender Offer is a dummy variable
that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance is the direct
distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Annual Stock Return is the buy-andhold stock return of the firm in the current fiscal year. Stock Return volatility is the standard deviation of
the daily stock return of the firm in the current fiscal year. Robust standard errors correcting
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable = ln(CEO Cash
Bonus)
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.887***
(0.199)

0.877***
(0.202)
0.0731
(0.159)

0.476**
(0.222)
0.138
(0.178)
2.28e-06***
(4.85e-07)
0.0393
(0.0369)
0.489
(0.498)
0.187
(0.966)

0.414*
(0.218)
0.00773
(0.177)
4.53e-06***
(1.26e-06)
0.0339
(0.0358)
-0.422
(0.543)
-0.264
(0.768)

Top Financial Advisor Dummy
Total Assets
Tobin’s Q
Leverage
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio

25

In unreported analysis using raw cash bonus as dependent variable, we find that CEO cash bonus is 0.89 million
dollars higher when the deal involves a personally connected financial advisor, controlling for firm financial and
deal characteristics.
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Table 8 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and CEO Bonus (Cont.)
Dependent Variable = ln(CEO Cash
Bonus)

(1)

(2)

Tender Offer

(3)

(4)

0.347*
(0.192)
-5.19e-05
(0.000117)

6.586***
(0.0884)

6.548***
(0.103)

6.418***
(0.268)

0.364**
(0.173)
0.000144
(0.000102)
0.486**
(0.236)
-59.66***
(10.72)
8.527***
(0.473)

N
N

N
N

N
Y

N
Y

350
0.053

350
0.051

304
0.160

264
0.312

Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance
Annual Stock Return
Stock Return Volatility
Constant

Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Admittedly, due to the data availability, we are unable to observe the complete picture of financial
advisor fees and the CEO cash bonus compensation. Nevertheless, based on the observable samples, we
show evidence that the financial advisor and the CEO of the bidding firm get higher benefit in the forms
of advisor fees and cash bonus, respectively, following a M&A deal when there are personal connections
between the bidder and bidder financial advisor. This evidence sheds light on the motivation of those
M&A deals carried out by connected bidders and their advisors. They are possibly utilizing the personal
connections to collude and benefit each other at the expenses of the shareholders.
3.6 Additional Robustness Checks
One possible concern regarding the results of our analysis is that it may be the geographical distance
between the bidder and bidder advisor, instead of the personal connection between the two firms, that
affects the outcome of the M&A deal, as geographically closer bidder and financial advisors have a better
chance to transmit information. Therefore, we control for the geographical distance between bidder and
bidder financial advisor in all of our analysis. Our results are robust with these controls. Second, we
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control for the reputation effects by including a dummy indicating whether the financial advisor is one of
the top 8 financial advisors ranked by the SDC League Table. Additionally, in unreported analysis, we
add the interaction between the bidder-bidder financial advisor connection and the top financial advisor as
an additional variable. Our results do not change, and the interaction effect is not significant. Third, in
unreported analysis, we control for whether the target hires a financial advisor, and whether the target has
a connection to their financial advisor. Our results still hold with these controls. Forth, we use an
alternative measure, social capital index, which uses principle component analysis to measure the social
capital intensity of an area considering all business and nonbusiness associations, as a determinant to
estimate the likelihood of a connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor exists. Our results still
hold. Additionally, we obtain similar results if using different time window to estimate the CAR, or if
using different measure for bidder size.
4. Conclusion
The financial advisors have been playing a crucial rule in M&A deals, which are some of the most
decisions a company makes. We extend the literature in understanding the rules and impact of a chosen
financial advisor could have on the outcome of M&A deals and extend the understand of the social
networks in finance. Using a sample of 675 M&A deals from 2000 to 2016 and the BoardEx database
recording the personal work-related connections of millions of corporate decision makers in the world, we
show that the existence of a connection between the top executives of the bidder and those of their
financial advisors causes a lower announcement CAR. Such impact is not a result of the endogenous
determinants of which financial advisor to hire. Using a Heckman two-stage procedure and switching
regression with endogenous switches, we show that a typical M&A deal with personal connections
between bidder and financial advisor could have had a 1.35% higher CAR if it was a deal without such
connection exists. We also show that M&A deals advised by financial advisors that are personally
connected to the bidder are more likely to complete, but it takes a longer time to resolve than deals
without such connections. Our evidence indicates the detrimental effects of the personal connections
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between bidder and bidder financial advisors. We also investigate the motivation behind such behavior
and phenomenon and find that the financial advisors are paid more fees for the advising services and the
CEOs of the bidder companies are paid a higher cash bonus following a successful merger. These
evidences imply that the both sides of the connection are pursuing personal interests at the expenses of
shareholders in terms of a value loss at the announcement and less efficient and timely in processing the
deal.
Our paper has several contributions to the literature. We extend the literature of social ties in finance
and show the economic value of such connections. We are the first to investigate the impact of personal
social ties between bidder and financial advisor under the context of M&A. We extend the literature in the
financial advisor and M&A performance by showing that such social ties as bidder-bidder financial
advisor are more detrimental than beneficial and diminishes the certification role of the financial advisors.
Last but not the least, we offer insights about how financial market perceives such personal connections
between bidder and bidder financial advisor and show that these connections are perceived negatively by
the market upon the announcement of the M&A deal.
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Chapter 3
Wealth Inequality, Leveraged Bubbles, and the Joneses Effect
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, asset bubbles have become more frequent in the wealthiest nations. Jorda, Schularick,
& Taylor (2015) document 139 equity and housing bubbles across 17 countries between 1870 and 2013, 97
(70%) of which occurred in the post-WWII era. They show that leveraged bubbles—those where assets
such as real estate are financed by a high proportion of debt—often accompany financial crises and are
especially damaging to economies when the bubbles burst.
Income and wealth inequality have also increased significantly over the last several decades. Using
data primarily from the Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances, Wolff (2016) shows that between
1962 and 2014, the share of income and wealth held by the top 5% of U.S. households increased 10 and 17
percentage points, respectively. Saez and Zucman (2016) use more detailed tax records to assess wealth at
the very top of the distribution. They find that U.S. wealth concentration among the top 0.1% of families
increased dramatically from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012, making wealth inequality is comparable to that of
the early 20th century. In contrast, the wealth share of the bottom 90% of taxpayers plummeted since the
mid-1980s mainly because middle-class savings plummeted. (Saez and Zucman, 2016) At the same time,
the debt burdens of middle class households increased dramatically. The mean debt to income ratio of the
middle three quartiles of households increased from 67% to 125% between 1983 and 2013, while the mean
debt to net worth ratio increased from 37% to 64%. (Wolff, 2016)
Researchers have begun to explore theoretical and empirical connections between inequality and the
build-up of leveraged bubbles. Rajan (2010) argues that wealth inequality was an underlying cause of the
recent subprime financial crisis because low- and middle-income households increasingly accumulated debt
to maintain or increase consumption, which left them prone to over-indebtedness and default on credit cards,
housing, and auto loans.
An important question is why households felt the need to maintain or increase consumption beyond
their earnings. In a survey of the literature connecting income inequality and financial crises, van Treeck
(2014) distinguishes credit supply effects from credit demand effects. The credit supply story is that
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growing wealth inequality facilitated easy access to credit to low-income households. Rajan (2010) argues
that government programs such as tax credits and Government Sponsored Enterprise housing affordability
goals postpone the political pressure on the government to address the financial stress felt by most
households. Kumhof et al. (2015) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in
which a crisis is driven by a permanent shift in income inequality because top earners use a large share of
their higher income to accumulate financial wealth in the form of loans to bottom earners, who eventually
default as relief from the high debt load outweighs the costs from default. Demarzo et al. (2008) present
an overlapping generations model where agents' utilities depend on the wealth of their cohort, which
induces relative wealth concerns. To avoid a relatively low-wealth outcome, agents herd into risky
securities, which drives down their expected return. Even though the bubble is likely to burst and lead to a
substantial loss, agents' relative wealth concerns make them afraid to trade against the crowd. With each of
these explanations, the political or financial system endogenously facilitates the credit transfer to meet the
desire of the wealthy to increase saving.
On the credit demand side, the neoclassical permanent consumption hypothesis could potentially
explain the increase in household credit because it allows for intertemporal consumption smoothing for
transitory, but only for transitory income shocks. The empirical evidence, however, shows that the decline
in income for many households was permanent; the variance of transitory earnings declined or remained
constant after the 1980s, providing little incentive for households to increase borrowing thereafter. (van
Treeck, 2014) Alternatively, the relative income hypothesis states that a household’s saving rate is an
increasing function of (i) the household’s position in the income distribution within its local reference group
and (ii) the relation of the household’s current to past income. (van Treeck, 2014) The first condition is
the “keeping up with the Joneses” effect because the desire to consume increases with the household’s
perception of relative status in its local group. The second condition is consistent with habit persistence
and the anchoring bias where an individual uses an incomplete reference point (e.g. last year’s income) to
make decisions about future consumption. The surge in income and wealth among the top 0.1% of
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taxpayers can lead to ‘expenditure cascades’ all the way down the income ladder if individuals are
influenced by the spending patterns of others just above them in the income distribution (Frank et al., 2010).
In addition, evidence from SCF shows that all households except the top 10% have become more strongly
indebted since the late 1980s.
In sum, wealth inequality may facilitate leveraged bubbles if it leads to status-driven, debt-financed
asset purchases by low- and middle-income households. These conditions plausibly existed in the U.S.
during the subprime housing boom between 2000 and 2006. As home prices began to rise briskly, many
households viewed a home purchase as a good investment because the momentum model suggested that
homes would continue to appreciate. The benefits to homeownership spread by “psychological contagion”
(Shiller, 2002) among friends, family, and neighbors. Households sought to improve their social status by
becoming first-time homeowners, upscaling to more expensive homes, or tapping their home equity to
purchase other durables.

Financial intermediaries facilitated the credit demand through large-scale

subprime securitization. (Mian and Sufi, 2009; Nadauld and Sherlund, 2013). The combination of these
factors surely contributed to the financial crisis and Great Recession.
In this paper, we examine the effects of wealth inequality and social status on asset bubbles in an
experimental lab setting. The treatments that we impose on traders mimic, to some degree, incentives that
many households faced in deciding whether to purchase or refinance a house during the housing boom. To
our knowledge, we are the first to use an experimental methodology to study the effect of wealth inequality,
and the joint effects of inequality, leverage, and status on asset bubbles. Our experimental design is
modeled after Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988; hereafter, SSW) and proceeds in three stages. Each
stage consists of six sessions with a base group of six inexperienced traders with equal initial endowments,
and a similar treatment group with unequal endowments where three randomly chosen traders are “rich”
and three are “poor.” The aggregate endowments of the equal and unequal sessions are always identical.
The second and third stages introduce leverage and status, respectively, in addition to unequal endowments.

75

The first stage examines the effect of equal versus unequal initial endowments.

Experimental

researchers have shown that momentum trading models explain asset price paths quite well. (Caginalp et
al., 2000a; Caginalp et al., 2000b) Traders with unequal endowments, however, may produce different
momentum dynamics than traders with equal endowments. On the one hand, the concentrated liquidity
among the rich traders may lead to greater momentum effects if they primarily trade with one another. On
the other hand, poor traders are less able to contribute to an emerging bubble because they are liquidity
constrained. The ultimate outcome may depend on the cognitive skills and degree of risk aversion of the
rich and poor traders.
The second stage introduces leverage where traders in both the equal and unequal endowment sessions
can borrow interest-free from the experimenter up to 75% of the market value of their asset holdings. This
condition simulates the high leverage of home financing. Experimental research has convincingly shown
that bubbles increase with liquidity in the market. The ability to purchase assets on margin, higher cash to
asset ratios for a given endowment, and an absolute increase in cash all lead to greater bubbles. (King et
al., 1993; Caginalp et al.; Haruvy and Noussair, 2006) In the treatment group, we expect the poor to borrow
more than the rich to facilitate asset purchases, which should ease the liquidity constraints on momentum.
Relative to the first stage, we expect higher asset price paths in both the equal and unequal sessions due to
the ability of traders to buy on margin.
The third stage retains leverage and adds the Joneses effect. After the 1st and 3rd periods of the 15period session, the trader(s) with the greatest number of asset shares stands and is recognized with applause
by the other traders. Traders learn early in the session that there is a status for holding a high number of
shares, even though accumulating more shares may not be financially rewarding if the price is above
fundamental value. We expect that the status incentive encourages traders, especially the poor traders, to
borrow to purchase assets, which increases price momentum and inflates the bubble. Schoenberg and
Haruvy (2012) are the first to introduce social effects in a manner similar to ours. After each period, all
traders observe either the highest account total (cash plus the market value of shares) of the leader, or the
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lowest account total of the laggard. They find that average asset prices are higher in sessions where traders
are informed of the highest account total, and lower when traders are informed of the lowest account total.
Further, they survey trader satisfaction and find that satisfaction ratings increase for the trader that is the
leader, decrease for the trader that is the laggard, and are lower for non-leaders when given the highest
account total than for non-laggards when given the lowest account total. These results are consistent with
the notion that relative status is an important part of traders’ utility functions.
Our Stage 1 results show that the unequally endowed sessions are more likely to experience both
underpricing and overpricing relative to the equally endowed sessions. This result is consistent with a
momentum effect that is either dampened from liquidity constraints by poor traders or enhanced from the
concentrated liquidity among the rich traders. When leverage is added in Stage 2, we find consistent
underpricing in the unequal sessions and lower average prices, again consistent with dampened momentum
effects. Poor traders do not take advantage of the ability to borrow interest-free from the experimenter.
The results from Stage 3 with the Joneses effect added are strikingly different. They show that the unequal
sessions experience higher amplitude, relative deviation, and average prices than the equal sessions. In
addition, poor traders are much more active in the early periods than they are in the other stages.
In sum, we observe that unequal initial endowments and the presence of a Joneses effect lead to
substantial overpricing as compared to situations where one or both factors is absent. The bubble is driven
in part by stronger demand for the asset and more aggressive borrowing by the low-wealth traders. To the
extent that these results transfer to real economies, they show that wealth inequality and access to credit
facilitate formation of a leveraged bubble, but the bubble may not emerge until psychological contagion is
sufficiently strong so that holding the asset becomes an important status benchmark.
2. Experimental Design
This section describes our experimental design, including participant recruiting and the structure of
each session. It describes the assets that participants traded, the three stages of the experiment, and the
post-session assessment.
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2.1 Recruiting and Session Structure
We generally follow and build upon the classic 15-period asset market experiment of SSW. We
conducted a total of 37 sessions at the Behavioral Business Research Lab at the University of Arkansas
from April 2016 to September 2017. Each session included 6 participants (traders) recruited from a pool of
undergraduate students across all majors at the University of Arkansas, though the bulk of the participants
were business and economics majors. Traders could not have participated in a similar asset market
experiment, nor could they repeat participation in this experiment. Traders were randomly seated in
cubicles in a computer laboratory, so they could not observe other traders’ screens. They did, however,
have an unobstructed view of the experimenter. They were not allowed to communicate with each other,
nor were they allowed to use personal electronic devices.
Each session began with an introduction that included time to read the printed instructions. The
experimenter then read aloud the first two pages of instructions, which contain the most important
information. Traders could raise their hands with questions, and the experimenter answered questions
individually. Two practice periods were run for participants to familiarize themselves with the trading
interface. A quiz followed to test the participants’ understanding, and the experimenter individually
checked the answers of each trader, followed by a brief explanation of all the questions to the traders. The
15 trading periods then started. In each period, traders had 2 minutes and 15 seconds to buy or sell shares
unless the trade violated leverage constraints or the no-shorting constraint. At the end of each session,
traders completed personal assessment information.
Sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes, and traders were paid a $7 show-up fee with additional
payments linked to cash held at the end of trading, a coin-flipping lottery based on risk preference responses,
and the score from a cognitive test. Traders earned an average of $21.61 from the experiment.
2.2 Assets and Trading
Assets, which we call shares, are modeled as in SSW. Shares have a finite life of 15 periods and become
worthless at the end of the session. The expected value of a share declines from 360 to 0 through the 15
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periods. At the end of each period, one of four randomly drawn dividends, which are 0, 8, 28, or 60, is paid
to the share’s holder. The sequence of the 15 dividends is preset by the experimenter, fixed for all sessions,
and unknown to traders.
2.3 Baseline Conditions
We run three stages of the experiment to observe the cumulative effects from (1) endowment inequality;
(2) leverage; and (3) the “Joneses Effect.” The baseline conditions described in this section apply to all
stages.
In each stage, we run six 26 sessions where the benchmark group of traders receive equal initial
endowments, and six sessions where traders receive initial unequal endowments.

In the unequal

endowment sessions, three randomly chosen traders are “rich,” and three are “poor.” The aggregate
endowments are the same across the equal and unequal sessions; only the distribution differs. At the end
of a session, traders receive payments in U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of 400 lab cash to $1 dollar.
Prior to the start of the session, we inform the traders as to whether the endowment distribution is equal
or unequal. In the unequal sessions, traders are privately and individually informed whether their
endowment type is “high” or “low,” and that half of the subjects have high endowments, and the other half
have low endowments. They are unaware, however, of the exact endowment of the opposite trader type.
2.4 Stage 1
In Stage 1, the benchmark sessions have equal endowments while the treatment sessions have unequal
endowments. No borrowing is allowed and no Joneses effect is present. Traders are endowed in the equal
sessions with 2160 laboratory (lab) cash and 6 shares. In the unequal sessions, three randomly chosen “rich”
traders receive 3240 lab cash and 9 shares; the three “poor” traders are endowed with 1080 lab cash and 3
shares.

26

We ran seven sessions with equal endowment in the first stage.
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2.5 Stage 2
Stage 2 introduces leverage by allowing traders to borrow at a zero-interest rate up to 75% of the current
market value of their shareholdings, which is determined by the most recent trading price. Each trader
receives an additional $5 beyond the show-up fee as a cushion for bankruptcy. Traders with negative ending
cash balances at the end of the session forfeit a portion of the cushion up to the maximum of $5. Again,
there are two session types. In the equal endowment sessions, each trader is endowed with 360 lab cash
and 6 shares. In the treatment sessions, three randomly chosen rich traders are endowed with 540 lab cash
and 9 shares, and three poor traders are endowed with 180 cash and 3 shares. For Stages 2 and 3, we
significantly reduce the initial cash endowment from Stage 1 to induce borrowing. Consequently, we are
unable to compare bubbl3e outcome levels between Stage 1 and the other two stages, but stages 2 and 3 are
directly comparable.
2.6 Stage 3
Stage 3 introduces the Joneses Effect. At the end of period 1, with no previous notice, the experimenter
enters the room and says “I would like to recognize the person or persons holding the highest number of
shares in the market. Look at your computer screen. If you hold the number of shares that is equal to the
highest number of shares held in your market, please stand up. Let’s all give them a round of applause.”
After applause, experimenter says: “You can sit now. We will recognize the people with the highest
number of shares one more time after period 3.” The experimenter repeats the statement at the end of period
3; no recognitions are performed thereafter. Although traders can see the person that stands up for
recognition, they cannot identity that trader in the computer simulation. Additionally, from period 2 until
the end of the session, a real-time display constantly appears on each trader’s screen with the number of
shares held by the person with the most shares in the market.
2.4 Market Setting
As in SSW, traders trade in a continuous double-auction market. The open orders and transacted orders
are visible to the traders in the real time, along with a graphical representation of transaction prices. Each
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trader’s cash balance and number of shares, as well as the most recent trading price are constantly displayed
on his/her individual screen. In stages 2 and 3, the trader’s current maximum borrowing limit is also
displayed. At the end of each period, the screen shows the current dividend drawn and the updated balance
information to the traders. There are 15 periods in each session, and traders have 2 minutes and 15 seconds
to trade per session. Dividends are added to cash balances, which, along with shares, carry over to
subsequent periods.
2.5 Trader Characteristics
Immediately after a session is concluded, traders complete a computerized questionnaire, which collects
demographic information and assesses risk preference and cognitive ability. Demographic questions collect
information about the traders’ gender, age, year in college, and major.
Each trader is asked to choose one of six lotteries, similar to the lotteries used by Eckel and Grossman
(2002), to elicit risk preference. The experimenter conducts the chosen lottery, privately and individually,
just before the trader receives cash payment, which includes any payment from the lottery outcome. Given
that the lottery question does not distinguish degrees of risk-seeking behavior (Charness et al. (2013), a
second question asks “In general, do you try to avoid taking risks or are you a person who is comfortable
taking risks?”
Traders’ cognitive abilities are assessed with a three-question Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).
(Frederick (2005) The three questions are:
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost?
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100
widgets?
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
For each question answered correctly, the trader receives an additional $0.25 payment.
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Table 1 reports summary statistics of trader characteristics. We recruited 222 traders, of which 126
were male and 96 were female. The mean age was 21.8, and 51.8% were economics or business majors.
In general, trader characteristics do not vary significantly across different sessions and experimental stages.
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Trader Characteristics
Summary statistics of the trader characteristics by stage. Stage 1 includes multiple sessions with equal and
unequal treatments; Stage 2 allows traders to buy shares on margin; Stage 3 introduces the Joneses effect.
Age is the age of the trader at the time of experiment. Gender is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a trader
is male, and 0 otherwise. No. correct in CRT is the number of questions the trader answers correctly in the
three-question Cognitive Reflection Test based on Frederick (2005). Patience is the response of the traders
to the following question: “Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great
patience?”, where the most impatient equals 0 and the most patient equals 1. Econ/Business major is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the trader is an economics or business major, and 0 otherwise.
Stage 1

Age
Gender (Female=0)
No. correct in CRT
Patience (Impatient=0)
Econ/Business major

N
35
36
36
36
36

Equal
Mean S.D.
23.86 5.87
0.50 0.51
1.53 1.16
6.81 1.69
0.44 0.50

N
41
42
42
42
42

Stage 2
Unequal
Mean S.D.
22.88 2.62
0.64 0.48
1.31 1.00
5.67 2.25
0.69 0.47

N
36
36
36
36
36

Equal
Mean S.D.
20.64 1.50
0.61 0.49
1.44 0.97
7.08 2.17
0.69 0.47

N
36
36
36
36
36

Stage 3
Unequal
Mean S.D.
20.31 2.42
0.53 0.51
1.08 1.08
6.81 1.95
0.67 0.48

N
36
36
36
36
36

Equal
Mean S.D.
21.81 4.13
0.39 0.49
1.28 1.23
5.64 2.37
0.36 0.49

N
36
36
36
36
36

Unequal
Mean S.D.
21.50 1.73
0.72 0.45
1.25 1.13
6.36 2.22
0.58 0.50

To measure risk preference, traders chose one of six lotteries, and we ranked the lotteries so that Lottery
1 was the safest and Lottery 6 was the riskiest. The mean choice was 3.42, reflecting moderate risk-seeking.
The mean response to the second question asking the trader to choose on a scale from 0 (risk avoidance) to
10 (risk seeking) her willingness to take risks in general was 5.71, indicating that traders had a slightly
greater risk taking preference than that suggested by the lottery response.
The mean CRT score of 1.31 is similar to what previous studies have found. Frederick (2005) found a
meant score of 1.24 after administering the CRT in 11 locations including universities, social events, and
online.
3. Bubble Metrics, Hypotheses and Results
In this section, we explain the three metrics used to compare bubble dynamics. We also state our three
hypotheses and present the results.
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3.1 Bubble Metrics
We assess bubbles using three common metrics. Amplitude is a widely used metric that measures the
overall degree of price change, scaled by the fundamental value of the asset, throughout the life of the asset.
(Haruvy and Noussair (2006); Huber and Kirchler (2012); Cheung et al. (2014); Andrade et al. (2015). It
is measured as follows:
𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{(𝑃̅𝑡 − 𝑓𝑡 )/𝑓𝑡 } − 𝑚𝑖𝑛{(𝑃̅𝑡 − 𝑓𝑡 )/𝑓𝑡 }
where 𝑃̅𝑡 is the mean asset price and 𝑓𝑡 is the fundamental value, both at period t. Stöckl et al. (2010)
develop and propose two alternative bubble measures, relative absolute deviation (RAD) and relative
deviation (RD), that better capture mispricing and overvaluation, and are less sensitive to the choice of
parameters in the measurement. These metrics are also widely used in the literature. (Stöckl et al. (2015);
Noussair and Tucker (2016) RAD and RD are quantified as follows:
15

1
̅̅̅̅ |
𝑅𝐴𝐷 =
∑|𝑃̅𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 |/|𝐹𝑉
15
𝑡=1

15

1
̅̅̅̅|
𝑅𝐷 =
∑(𝑃̅𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 )/|𝐹𝑉
15
𝑡=1

̅̅̅̅ is the mean
where 𝑃̅𝑡 is the mean asset price at period t, 𝐹𝑉𝑡 is the fundamental value at period t, and 𝐹𝑉
fundamental of the market, which is 192 in our study.
3.2 Endowment Inequality
H1: Asset bubbles are larger when traders have unequal initial endowments rather than equal initial
endowments, holding total endowment fixed.
We hypothesize that asset bubbles will be larger in the unequal sessions relative to the equal sessions
because the concentrated liquidity among rich traders will boost price momentum, and these effects will
outweigh liquidity constraints among the poor traders that weaken momentum. In the absence of leverage
or a Joneses effect, we have no theoretical reason to believe that the concentrated liquidity effect will
dominate the liquidity constraint effect. Indeed, we just as easily could have presented the opposite

83

hypothesis. Ultimately, the outcome is empirically determined, and it may depend on the randomly
assigned trader characteristics of the rich and poor traders.
We test H1 in Stage 1 of the experiment, where traders have equal initial endowments in the benchmark
sessions and unequal initial endowments in the treatment sessions. Figure 1 shows the volume-weighted
mean price and the mean trading volume by period of the benchmark and treatment sessions. The left panel
shows that neither the equal nor unequal sessions produced significant bubbles relative to fundamental
value. However, mean prices from the unequal sessions are much lower than the fundamental value during
the first eight periods, suggesting that liquidity constraints may have dampened the price path. Consistent
with this view, the right panel shows that mean trading volumes in the unequal sessions start out far lower
and are less volatile across all periods than mean trading volumes in the equal sessions.

Figure 1. Trading Prices and Volume of Stage 1
Mean trading prices and the mean volume of equal and unequal markets by period for Stage 1, which
includes multiple sessions with equal and unequal treatments. The left panel shows plots of mean prices,
and the right panel shows plots of mean volume.
Panel A of Table 2 report Stage 1 summary statistics of the three bubble metrics by session. Mean
amplitude is slightly lower in the unequal sessions, relative absolute deviation is higher, and relative
deviation is lower, reflecting the stronger underpricing in those sessions. Panel B of Table 2 reports MannWhitney-Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests at the session level. We find no statistically significant difference
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between the two treatments in terms of amplitude and RD, but the higher RAD is statistically different at
the 5% level. This result is consistent with the price path observed in Figure 1. If anything, unequal initial
endowments produce bubbles where prices are below fundamental value, consistent with weak momentum
driven by liquidity constraints.
Table 2. Bubble Measures Comparison from Inequality
Comparison of bubble measures from stage 1. Stage 1 includes multiple sessions with equal and unequal
̅̅̅
̅̅̅
𝑃𝑡 −𝑓𝑡
𝑃 −𝑓
} min { 𝑡𝑓 𝑡},
𝑓𝑡
𝑡

treatments. Panel A reports mean bubble measures by session. 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = max {
1

𝑅𝐴𝐷 = 15 ∑15
𝑡=1

̅̅̅𝑡 −𝐹𝑉𝑡 |
|𝑃
,
̅̅̅̅ |
|𝐹𝑉

1

̅
̅̅̅̅
and 𝑅𝐷 = 15 ∑15
𝑡=1(𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 )/|𝐹𝑉 | . Panel B reports Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test

results of bubble measures between equal and unequal endowment sessions.
Panel A: Bubble Measures
Equal Endowments
Session
Amplitude
RAD
1
0.894
0.166
2
1.375
0.297
3
1.739
0.317
4
1.075
0.269
5
1.111
0.245
6
1.067
0.234
Mean

1.186

0.248

RD
-0.079
0.102
-0.102
-0.136
-0.188
-0.128

Unequal Endowments
Amplitude
RAD
1.422
0.495
0.408
0.201
0.989
0.358
1.189
0.522
1.281
0.461
1.306
0.645
1.086
0.497
1.121
0.463

Session
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Mean

-0.091

Panel B: Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test between Equal and Unequal Treatments
Amplitude
RAD
z-stat
0.000
2.286
P-value
1.000
0.022

RD
0.069
-0.186
-0.178
-0.394
-0.304
0.34
-0.388
-0.16

RD
-1.143
0.253

We also evaluate how prices deviate from the fundamental value in the two treatments. Following
Haruvy and Noussair (2006), we test whether the mean price per period is statistically different from the
fundamental

value,

and

if

so,

in

which

direction.

Specifically,

we

test

if 𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 =

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 – 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 is statistically different from 0. We find that the mean of
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 for the equal endowment treatment is -16.95 (S.D. = 7.92, p-value = 0.035) and that the mean of
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 for the unequal treatment is -28.47 (S.D. = 10.95, p-value = 0.011). These results indicate a
significant negative deviation of price from fundamental value in both equal and unequal sessions. We test
further, at the period level of observation, whether the price deviation from the fundamental value is
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different between equal and unequal sessions. The results show that the price deviation differences are not
statistically significant (T = -1.01, p-value = 0.316).
In sum, in the absence of leverage and the Joneses effect, the unequal distribution of endowments
among traders seems to weaken momentum effects, which makes asset bubbles where prices are
significantly above fundamental value less likely to form. This observation is analogous to a housing
market where demand is weak because relatively low-wealth households do not have the savings to
purchase homes and they have limited access to credit. Cynamon and Fazzari (2016) argue that the high
inequality in the U.S. economy combined with tighter borrowing constraints on the bottom 95% of
households help explain the slow recovery from the Great Recession.
3.3 Inequality and Leverage
H2: Asset bubbles are larger when traders have unequal initial endowments rather than equal initial
endowments, holding total endowment fixed, and when all traders can leverage share values by
borrowing at a zero-interest rate from the experimenter.
We test H2 in Stage 2 of our experiment. As in Stage 1, traders either have equal or unequal
endowments in two different treatments, while the total endowment in the market are constant. Traders can
borrow up to 75% of the current market value of their shareholdings, which is determined by the most
recent trading price. We significantly reduced the initial cash endowment from that in Session 1 to induce
borrowing especially among poor traders. Although all traders have access to liquidity given the ability to
buy on margin, we should observe poor traders taking on the most leverage, which relaxes liquidity
constraints and increases the momentum effect (Day & Chen 1993). We hypothesize that the momentum
effect will be greater in the unequal sessions than the equal sessions because the concentration of wealth
among the rich combined with leverage by the poor should induce more buying activity in the early rounds
The results do not support H2. The two charts in Figure 2 shows the volume-weighted mean price and
the mean trading volume, respectively, by period for the two session types. From the left panel, we observe
that mean prices from both the equal and unequal sessions show large negative bubbles relative to

86

fundamental value before period 8. Modest bubbles emerge in both session types in later periods. The
right panel of Figure 2 shows that trading volume in early periods is higher in the unequal sessions as
expected, but trading in the unequal sessions declines more sharply than trading in the equal sessions
throughout the 15 periods.

Figure 2. Trading Prices and Volume of Stage 2
Mean trading prices and the mean volume of equal and unequal markets by period for Stage 1, which
includes multiple sessions with equal and unequal treatments. The left panel shows plots of mean prices,
and the right panel shows plots of mean volume.
Bubble metrics show no statistical difference between the equal and unequal sessions in Stage 2. Panel
A of Table 3 reports the three bubble metrics by session. As with Stage 1 results, unequal session means
show lower amplitude, higher RAD, and lower RD relative to equal-session means. Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon Rank-Sum tests at the session level, reported in the panel B of Table 3, show no statistically
significant differences between the two session types for all three bubble measurements.
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Table 3. Bubble Measures Comparison from Inequality and Leverage
Comparison of bubble measures from stage 2. Stage 2 allows traders to buy shares on margin. Panel A
̅̅̅
̅̅̅
𝑃𝑡 −𝑓𝑡
𝑃 −𝑓
} min { 𝑡𝑓 𝑡},
𝑓𝑡
𝑡

reports mean bubble measures by session. 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = max {

1

𝑅𝐴𝐷 = 15 ∑15
𝑡=1

̅̅̅𝑡 −𝐹𝑉𝑡 |
|𝑃
,
̅̅̅̅ |
|𝐹𝑉

1
̅̅̅̅ |. Panel B reports Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test results of bubble measures
(𝑃̅ − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 )/|𝐹𝑉
and 𝑅𝐷 = ∑15
15 𝑡=1 𝑡
between equal and unequal endowment sessions.

Panel A: Bubble Measures
Equal Endowments
Session
Amplitude
RAD
1
2.060
0.549
2
2.429
0.206
3
0.082
0.584
4
0.865
0.420
5
0.996
0.553
6
1.829
0.468
Mean
1.039
0.498

RD
0.303
-0.188
-0.463
0.047
-0.388
0.196
-0.160

Session
1
2
3
4
5
6
Mean

Unequal Endowments
Amplitude
RAD
2.272
0.288
0.945
0.553
0.422
0.608
0.421
0.679
0.729
0.824
1.085
0.532
0.756
0.654

RD
0.061
-0.226
-0.400
-0.562
-0.643
-0.124
-0.420

Panel B: Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test between Equal and Unequal Treatments
z-stat
P-value

Amplitude
-0.160
0.873

RAD
1.441
0.150

RD
-1.281
0.200

Based on the period-level observations, prices do not significantly deviate from fundamental value in
the equal endowment sessions (T = -1.313, p-value = 0.193), but they do deviate from fundamental value
in the unequal sessions (T = -4.630, p-value = 0.000). The cross-treatment T-test indicates that the prices
are statistically significant between the two session types, where both types exhibit negative bubbles, but
unequal sessions have significantly lower prices than the equal sessions (T = -4.003, p-value = 0.000).
We conclude, unexpectedly, that asset markets that combine unequal initial endowments with leverage
do not produce larger bubbles than asset markets that combine equal initial endowments with leverage.
3.3 Inequality, Leverage and the Joneses Effect
H3: Asset bubbles are larger when: (i) traders have unequal initial endowments rather than equal
initial endowments, holding total endowment fixed; (ii) traders can leverage share by borrowing at a
zero-interest rate from the experimenter; and (iii) traders are incentivized to purchase shares in the
early rounds by a “Keeping up with the Joneses” effect.
Stage 3 of the experiment tests H3. The only difference between Stage 2 and Stage 3 is that the
experimenter enters the trading room after periods 1 and 3 and recognizes the person(s) with the highest
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shares, who then receives a round of applause by other traders. Relative to equal sessions, we expect
unequal sessions to produce bigger bubbles because poor traders who begin with 3 shares will observe wide
gaps between their own asset holdings and the top asset holder who is surely a rich trader that began with
9 shares. The gaps between traders will be smaller in the equal sessions because each trader begins with 6
shares, so the Joneses effect will be smaller.
In support of H3, we do observe significant bubbles in Stage 3, especially in the unequal sessions,
which contrasts sharply with Stage 2 results. The mean price trend and trading volume of the two session
types are exhibited in Figure 3. The bubble pattern is obvious. The left panel shows that the unequal sessions
produce a higher mean price in 14 of 15 periods. The right panel shows that the unequal sessions produce
a higher trading volume in 9 of 15 periods, especially during the middle part of the session when the bubble
grows most dramatically.
Figure 3. Trading Prices and Volume of Stage 3
Mean trading prices and the mean volume of equal and unequal markets by period for Stage 3, which adds
the Joneses effect. The left panel shows plots of mean prices, and the right panel shows plots of mean
volume.

We report the bubble metrics and comparison tests for Stage 3 in Table 4. Summary statistics in Panel
A shows that all three metrics are higher for the unequal session than the equal sessions, and both session
types have positive bubbles as shown by the positive value of RD. Panel B reports the Mann-Whitney-
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Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests at the session level. The difference in amplitude between the unequal and equal
sessions is statistically significant at the 5% level, and the difference in RD is statistically significant at the
10% level.
Table 4. Bubble Measures Comparison from Inequality, Leverage and the Joneses Effect
Comparison of bubble measures from stage 3. Stage 3 adds the Joneses effect. Panel A reports mean bubble
̅̅̅
̅̅̅
̅̅̅𝑡 −𝐹𝑉𝑡 |
|𝑃
𝑃 −𝑓
𝑃 −𝑓
1
measures by session. 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = max { 𝑡 𝑡 } min { 𝑡 𝑡 } , 𝑅𝐴𝐷 = ∑15
, and 𝑅𝐷 =
𝑡=1
̅̅̅̅
𝑓𝑡

1 15
∑ (𝑃̅
15 𝑡=1 𝑡

𝑓𝑡

15

|𝐹𝑉 |

̅̅̅̅ |. Panel B reports Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test results of bubble measures between
− 𝐹𝑉𝑡 )/|𝐹𝑉
equal and unequal endowment sessions.
Panel A: Bubble Measures
Equal Endowments
Session
Amplitude
RAD
1
1.509
0.287
2
1.853
0.387
3
2.276
0.609
4
2.230
0.442
5
1.665
0.993
6
3.693
0.076
Mean
2.269
0.409

RD
-0.239
0.207
0.005
-0.353
0.932
0.028
0.021

Session
1
2
3
4
5
6
Mean

Unequal Endowments
Amplitude
RAD
2.370
0.071
5.460
1.332
1.939
0.376
2.714
0.502
3.027
0.740
8.281
1.383
3.240
0.559

RD
0.022
1.159
0.221
0.147
0.390
1.232
0.376

Panel B: Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test between Equal and Unequal Treatments
z-stat
P-value

Amplitude
2.082
0.037

RAD
0.801
0.423

RD
1.761
0.078

The period-level T-test for the equal and unequal sessions shows statistically significant price deviation
from fundamental value (T = 4.885, p-value = 0.000). In contrast, the equal treatment does not exhibit
statistically significant price deviation from fundamental value (T = 1.379, p-value = 0.171). The crosstreatment T-test indicates that differences in prices are statistically significant between the two treatments,
and the unequal sessions have significantly higher mean prices than the equal sessions (T = 3.2100, p-value
= 0.002).
In sum, Stage 3 results show that unequal endowments combined with leveraging and the Joneses effect
create significantly greater bubbles than when equal endowments combine with leveraging and the Joneses
Effect.
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3.4 Bubble Formation Analysis
Taken together, results from the three stages of our experiment suggest that social status plays a strong
role in facilitating asset bubbles. Adding the Keeping up with the Joneses incentive in Stage 3 produced
statistically significant positive bubbles relative to the negative bubbles observed in Stages 1 and 2 .
We can better understand how social status affects bubble formation by directly comparing stages 2
and 3. If the Joneses effect is strong, we would expect poor traders to buy more assets relative to rich
traders in early periods compared with markets with no Joneses effect. Panels A and B of Figure 4 plot
mean buy volumes by period separately for rich and poor traders for stages 2 and 3, respectively. Panel A
shows that when the Joneses effect is absent, rich traders consistently buy more shares than poor traders.
In Panel B, however, poor traders on average buy more shares than rich traders in 10 of 15 periods. Similar
effects exist from the sellers’ side. Panel C shows that in the absence of the Joneses effect, rich traders
consistently sell more shares than poor traders. Panel D shows that when the Joneses effect is introduced,
poor traders more actively sell shares in 6 of 15 periods. We conclude that bubbles are partly driven by
higher asset demand by poor traders.
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Figure 4. Trading Volume in Stages 2 and 3
Figure 4 plots the mean trading volume by period in Stages 2 and 3. Panels A and B plots the mean trading
volume by buyer types in Stages 2 and 3, respectively. Panels C and D plots the mean trading volume by
seller types in Stages 2 and 3, respectively.

We further compare the borrowing patterns of the high and low endowed traders in Stages 2 and 3. If
the Joneses Effect is strong, we would expect poor traders to borrow more frequently than the rich traders
in the environment where the Joneses Effect is present. Figure 5 plots the mean number of traders that have
a net borrowing at the end of each periods by trader endowment types. The left panel shows the plots for
Stage 2 and the right one shows those for Stage 3. It is obvious that in stage 3, the number of borrowing
traders are similar most of the time between rich and poor. However in Stage 3, there are consistently more
poor borrowers than rich borrowers starting from period 4, the period following the two recognitions of the
trader with the highest number of shares. Note that, when the trader is still in net borrowing position by the
end of the 15 periods, he is considered as having a bankruptcy, as all shares become worthless at that
moment. Figure 5 shows that there are more bankruptcy occurs for poor traders in Stage 3 than in Stage 2,
indicating a more aggressive borrowing behavior for the poor traders in Stage 3 that results in more financial
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instability by the end of the trading. We therefore conclude that the bubbles are also partially driven by the
excessive borrowing behavior of the poor traders when the Joneses Effect is present.
Figure 5. Number of Borrowers in Stages 2 and 3
Figure 5 plots the mean number of net borrowers in Stages 2 and 3. The left panel shows the mean number
of net borrowers in Stage 2, and the right panel shows that in Stage 3.

4. Conclusion
Literature has shown that leveraged real estate bubbles have become more frequent, increasing financial
instability and imposing extensive damage on economies. Also, low- and middle-income households are
increasingly prone to over-indebtedness and default on credit cards, housing, and auto loans. Part of the
reason is because wealth inequality in the U.S. and many other countries has increased over the last couple
decades, and the poor households want to keep up with the living standards and social class with their
relatively rich neighbors, which is so-called “keeping up with the Joneses.” Hence, the poor households
may end up with buying a house by taking on too much debt, which eventually causes greater asset bubbles
and financial instability. In a lab setting, we test how wealth inequality, borrowing, and “keeping up with
the Joneses” effect influence asset bubbles. We recruit undergraduate students to trade assets in a computer
lab, and subsequently study the trading results. We find that wealth inequality alone does not result in
different asset bubble dynamics relative to markets with equal initial endowments. Instead, it is the wealth
inequality, combining with leveraging and “keeping up with the Joneses” effect that creates asset bubbles.
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Additionally, we observe that the low endowment traders are more active in trading and are more aggressive
in borrowing when the Joneses effect is present, and this partially contributes to the asset bubbles.
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